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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the role of financial practice in the develop-
ment of mathematics as applied in human judgement. The basis of the paper is in 
historical research from the 1990s that argues that the monetisation of western com-
merce, which abstracted value into quantified price, was synthesised with scholas-
tic analysis resulting in a “mathematical mechanistic world picture” that led to the 
widespread use of mathematics in science from the seventeenth century. An aspect 
of this process was the quantification of chance that led to the development of math-
ematical probability, the branch of mathematics most relevant to judgement and the 
focus of this paper. Ideas from this historical research are related to the fundamental 
theorem of asset pricing (FTAP), the foundational theory of contemporary financial 
mathematics. The paper observes that vestiges of medieval scholastic attitudes to 
financial ethics can be discerned in the FTAP, offering a novel interpretation of the 
mathematical theorem. The paper then considers the Dutch book argument (DBA), 
the most popular justification for subjective probability. The paper’s main contribu-
tion is in describing the significance of financial practice in validating the DBA and 
the paper explains how the FTAP addresses some criticisms of how the DBA repre-
sents beliefs. The conclusions emphasise the distinction between pure and practical 
reasoning and that this should be mirrored in a distinction between the mathematics 
of physica and practica. This point is important as mathematics is becoming more 
widespread in modelling, and directing, social systems.
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1 Introduction
This paper highlights the significance of financial practice in establishing math-
ematical criteria relating to judgement in the presence of uncertainty. When 
applied to physical systems, mathematics passively represents those systems 
whereas when mathematics is applied to social systems it can actively direct 
those systems. Finance provides an example of this effect and this paper consid-
ers the role of finance in the development of mathematical approaches to judge-
ment under uncertainty.
The paper draws on recent research on the role of commercial ethics in the 
development of probability up to the eighteenth century, including Hadden (1994), 
Crosby (1997), Kaye (1998), Franklin (2001), Sylla (2003, 2006) and Bellhouse 
(2005). Developing Johnson (2015), this is combined with an analysis of contem-
porary theories of financial mathematics, developed between Harrison and Kreps 
(1979) and Delbaen and Schachermayer (1998), and provides insights into the 
Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) model, which is of interest in the history and philos-
ophy of mathematical practice (Wagner 2017, pp. 6–10). The paper finds similarities 
between the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing (FTAP) and scholastic attitudes 
to commercial ethics that become clear when the abstract mathematics of the FTAP 
are considered with an understanding of the scholastic perspective. This highlights 
normative aspects of an ostensibly positive theory and reflects this paper’s motiva-
tion in Putnam’s criticism of the ‘fact-value dichotomy’ (Putnam 2002). The analy-
sis of the FTAP leads to some novel insights on the role of financial practice in 
justifying the Dutch Book Argument (DBA), which is itself the most popular justi-
fication for subjective probability (Skyrms 1984; van Fraassen 1984; Hàjek 2009).
The DBA is explained in terms of the practice of ‘dual quoting’ in financial 
markets and how this practice imposes sincerity on market participants. On this 
basis, the final section explains how markets are deliberative and the FTAP’s basis 
in measure theoretic probability means that it can accommodate the dynamic 
nature of markets and so is not subject to some of the criticisms of the DBA when 
considered in terms of subjective probability. Building on Habermas (1984) and 
Misak (2002) the case is made that for financial markets to be successful, they 
must adhere to a principle of benevolence, or charity. The main conclusion is that 
judgement in social systems must consider the subjective truthfulness and social 
rightness, not just objective truth, associated with scientific representations.
The approach taken in the paper is abductive theoretical analysis (Peirce 1957, 
pp. 236–237; Swedberg 2015) that explores the relationship of financial practice, 
mathematics and ethics to judgement under uncertainty. Abductive reasoning 
is based on gathering observations as widely as possible and the argument pre-
sented here uses scholarship from mathematics, finance, history, sociology, reli-
gion, literature and philosophy. The novelty of the argument is based on its broad 
basis in scholarship and a focus on financial practice. This means it is distinctive 
from Thicke (2017), for example. An abductive argument should resemble a cable 
rather than a chain, meaning that different threads work coherently together rather 
than relying on a sequence of irrefutable deductive links.
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The paper is empirical in Locke’s sense of exploring the origins and evolution of 
ideas, specifically the development of mathematical ideas and financial theory in the 
context of financial practice. Consequently, the paper might appear to be history: it 
is not. It uses historical research as strands in the overall argument. Much of this his-
torical research might be unfamiliar and so summaries are presented.
Care should be taken in reading this paper not to confuse the financial practices 
described in relation to markets with economic theories of markets. Economics can 
exist without commercial exchange—in pure command economies—while com-
merce can exist without money—in barter exchange. Finance, in the context of this 
paper, is the use of money to enable temporally or spatially separated transactions: 
an immediate cash purchase is commercial not financial in this construction. Finance 
provides interesting problems for science because the temporal and spatial separa-
tion of transactions creates radical uncertainty (Knight 1921; King 2016) that defies 
prediction, so that there are few ‘matters of fact’ relating to financial transactions. 
The radical uncertainty of finance creates the connection to mathematical probabil-
ity. While the ‘philosophy of economics’ is an established field, though relatively 
small compared to the ‘philosophy of mathematics’, little attention has been paid to 
the role of finance in generating norms that more theoretical fields rely on. We do 
not explore the reasons for this lack of attention but offer two tentative explanations. 
Firstly, finance is practical, rather than theoretical as economics and mathematics 
are. Secondly, finance is widely perceived as essentially corrupting, though this was 
not always the case (Fourcade and Healy 2007), and so cannot be considered as the 
basis of legitimate fields of study. This paper challenges this view.
The next section puts the paper in context and explains the approach it will take. 
Following this introduction the main argument, that the ethical assessment of finan-
cial contracts had an impact on the mathematical representation of chance, begins 
by observing that the financialisation of Medieval European commerce created a 
need to understand fluctuating, abstract relationships that stimulated the widespread 
use of mathematics. This occurred as Aristotelian philosophy began to dominate 
Catholic thinking and, on this basis, the church developed a doctrine on usury. A 
synthesis of commercial practice, Catholic doctrine and mathematics resulted in 
Albert the Great realising that Accidents, not Substances, were measured initiating 
the mathematisation of physics. In this context the idea of mathematical probability 
emerged out of the study of financial ethics, which was regarded as involving sub-
jective and ethical judgement. These ideas were central in the development of prob-
ability through to the eighteenth century when the subject began to be understood in 
terms of repeatable, objective, experiments.
On this basis, the fourth section describes the Fundamental Theorem of Asset 
Pricing (FTAP), which is the foundation of contemporary financial mathematics. 
The FTAP is a consequence of Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability using 
measure theory and was formulated to provide a Grundbegriffe for asset pricing 
based on the Black–Scholes–Merton option pricing model, which was a result of 
academic finance. The FTAP only guarantees precise prices if markets are complete 
and the causes and consequences of incompleteness are discussed. The economic 
justification for how financial markets ensure that prices conform to the FTAP is 
explained. On the basis of the discussion in the second section, the FTAP is related 
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to scholastic ethics. The section ends by observing that the FTAP can be viewed as 
an abstract mathematical result, a description of financial practice or an expression 
of financial morality.
The FTAP is closely related to the Dutch Book Argument (DBA), regarded as 
the most popular justification for modern approaches to subjective probability and 
Bayesian Inference. This is discussed in the fifth section of the paper. An objection 
raised about the DBA is that it is based on an assumption that there are ‘bookies’ 
that can compel an agent to bet on their beliefs. The main contribution of the paper 
is in a description of how this compulsion is accomplished in modern financial mar-
kets, based on the institution of ‘jobbers’ or ‘market makers’.
Jobbing is made possible because of the abstraction of physical assets into con-
tracts through financialisation. This enables those without property to engage in 
market speculation and soon after the practice emerged there were attempts by prop-
erty owners to suppress it. In order to address concerns that jobbers were able to 
manipulate markets, the policy developed of requiring jobbers to simultaneously 
quote prices at which they would buy and sell an asset, allowing the counterparty 
to choose which side to take. This ‘dual quoting’ imposes subjective truthfulness 
on the jobbers, since a jobber is required to act on their statements. Despite being 
sincere, a jobber’s price should not be assumed to represent the jobber’s belief. This 
toleration of falsehoods facilitates the reliability of jobbers’ quotes. While jobbers 
deliver subjective valuations, objective evaluation of a price is delivered through 
the FTAP. Utility plays an important role in economic valuation, by modelling indi-
vidual preferences, where as it plays only a peripheral role in the FTAP of jobbers 
practice. The FTAP and DBA price by selecting a probability measure. A discussion 
of the historic relationship between utility based and probability-based approaches 
to pricing is given.
The DBA relates to establishing the coherence of a single statement. Jobber-
mediated financial markets involve a sequence of statements—prices—being made 
by a community. Because the FTAP is based on Kolmogorov’s measure theoretic 
probability it accommodates the dynamic nature of markets and avoids some criti-
cisms of the DBA, which is usually considered in terms of subjective probability. 
These points are made in the sixth section that also discusses the role of the abstract-
ing process of financialisation in enabling jobber-mediated markets and the emascu-
lation of power. There is a discussion of the idea that markets are centres of commu-
nicative action and the observation that this implies the social correctness of a price 
needs to be accommodated. An argument is presented that the classical virtue 
charity/caritas/ἀγάπη/ihsan (إحسان)/ren (仁) covers this criterion, just as the mathe-
matics of the FTAP cover the objective criterion and the institution of jobbers the 
subjective criterion for effective market deliberation. This argument is made with 
reference to Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, the failure of the hedge fund, 
Long Term Capital Management in 1997 and the role of British Quakers in funding 
the ‘Industrial Revolution’. This section addresses concerns that markets are intrinsi-
cally corrupting and so should not be considered as enabling mathematics. It relates 
to discussions about the moral status of markets (Fourcade and Healy 2007) and 
challenges the conventional view that financial economics is ‘under-socialised’ 
(Granovetter 1985).
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2  Context and fundamental ideas
The topic this paper addresses is that of rational methods of dealing with uncer-
tainty. In classical Greece, the application of knowledge, techne, was seen as 
counterbalancing the problems of Tyche (Nussbaum 2001, pp. xvii–xviii). Later, 
Aristotle distinguished phronesis, episteme, and techne. Techne was the ability to 
produce something material and, by the nature of material objects, was a means 
to some other end (Aristotle 2011, p. VI.4). Episteme was related to understand-
ing universal ideas, so could be taught, and provided the basis for techne. Aris-
totle did not think different ethical goods were commensurable (Nussbaum 2001, 
pp. 294–297). This implied that there could not be a universal episteme for moral-
ity and, consequently, morality had to be understood on the basis of individual 
experience rather than universal ideas. This experimental knowledge was called 
phronesis (Aristotle 2011, p. 109b15; Long 2006, p. 162), and enabled people to 
“manage well the circumstances which they encounter day by day, and who pos-
sess a judgment which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise” (Paul 2014, 
p. 11).
Aristotle’s definition of phronesis, as a characteristic founded in experience 
rather than episteme meant it was incompatible with mathematics, which related 
to abstract generalisations not to specific circumstances (Aristotle 2011, p. VI.8). 
The context of this paper is the how mathematical, universal and indubitable, 
approaches to dealing with uncertainty replaced approaches rooted in personal 
experience that were contingent and specific. This transformation began in the 
mid-seventeenth century, for example in Hobbes’ claim that ethics, relating to 
personal preferences, could not be part of philosophy, which dealt with universal 
truths (Hobbes 2017, pp. VIII, XII, XLVI). By the mid-nineteenth century the 
process was complete, with consequentialist morality being defined in terms of 
prudential calculation.
The idea that provides the analytical framework for this paper is Locke’s dis-
tinction of physica, practica and semeiotika (Locke 1690, pp. 21.1–4). Physica 
related to the knowledge of things (including spirits); practica to the attainment 
of the ‘right’ (ethics); and semeiotika referred to the signs used to understand and 
convey ideas to others (logic, language, mathematics). The distinction between 
physica and practica is evident in Kant’s separation of the Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft and the Kritik der praktischen Vernunft. The distinction is also echoed in 
Laplace’s separation of mathematics into Mécanique Céleste (1799–1825)/Expo-
sition du système du monde (1796) and Théorie analytique des probabilités 
(1812)/Théorie des probabilités (1819), suggesting that there was a mathematics 
pertinent to ‘things’ and a mathematics relevant to judgements. This paper is con-
cerned with the use of mathematics as applied to judgements in the attainment of 
the right. Locke’s distinction of physica, practica and semeiotika was formulated 
and was influential throughout the period when mathematical approaches to deal-
ing with chance were replacing the approaches founded on personal phronesis.
Hacking (2006) stimulated a revival of interest in the history of mathematical 
approaches to dealing with uncertainty by arguing that before the Renaissance, 
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probability related to matters of opinion, with opinions being founded on 
authority. During the Renaissance, the idea of non-deductive inference, ‘inter-
nal evidence’ emerged and argued that the older, subjective ‘probable opinion’ 
co-existed with a more modern objective, epistemic and ‘statistical’ approach 
until the former was supplanted by the latter in the nineteenth century. Daston 
(1980) adapted Hacking’s epistemic-aleatory distinction into a ‘moral’ approach 
to probability, centred on equity and justice, and a ‘prudential’ approach, 
which “weighed individual possibilities for profit or loss with an eye to secur-
ing an advantage” (1980, pp. 241–242). The ‘prudential’ approach to probability 
replaced the ‘moral’ approach with “the advent of a new model of explanation for 
the social sciences which emphasized social regularities rather than individual 
rationality, coupled with recognition of the independence of mathematical prob-
ability from its applications” (Daston 1980, p. 235). In Daston (1998) the argu-
ment becomes one of a transformation of the subjectively reasoning l’homme 
éclair into the objectively calculating l’homme moyen.
The connection between the emergent mathematical ideas around chance and 
Locke’s philosophy was evident in the description of probability given in the 1765 
edition of the Encyclopédie (Lubières 2008). There, a physical approach to probabil-
ity is described based on the “nature of things” while the practical approach to prob-
ability is founded on experience on the past which is used to predict the future. In 
this paper the two approaches are labelled as objective and subjective, respectively. 
Classical probability, as developed before 1838, made little distinction between 
objective and subjective probability. However, by the first half of the twentieth cen-
tury, there were clear demarcations between objective and subjective approaches 
(Kendall M. G. 1949; Aldrich 2008). Objective probability encompasses the empiri-
cal approaches associated with Montmort, de Moivre, Venn, Fisher and von Mises. 
In this paper, it also includes the logical approach to probability, touched on by 
Keynes and developed by Carnap. Subjective probability is implicit in Bernoulli 
(Hacking 1971) and explicit in Bayes, Morgan, Ramsey, de Finetti and Savage.
Daston created an association between the objective and prudential approaches 
to probability in contrast to the moral and subjective approaches. The canonical ori-
gins of mathematical probability is in the 1654 Pascal and Fermat solution to the 
Problem of Points and is considered to be part of the ‘moral’ approach to probability 
(Sylla 2003, 2006). However, the model Fermat and Pascal employed is formally 
identical, as a multi-period binomial model, to the 1979 Cox–Ross–Rubinstein 
(CRR) option pricing model (Cox et  al. 1979), which is regarded as an objective 
and prudential model of finance. While the formal equivalence is clear, what is less 
obvious is whether there is a correspondence between Pascal and Fermat’s concep-
tion of probability with that used by CRR. On the basis of scholarship originating in 
this observation, the paper makes an assumption that the material nature of financial 
contracts, their physica as ‘things’, has not changed significantly between medieval 
times and today but there have been significant changes in the understanding of the 
mathematics that describe contracts—semeiotika—and in society’s ethical under-
standing of them—practica. This assumption is based on comparing medieval and 
contemporary financial instruments. For example, the paper explains that the under-
lying structure of modern securitisation is present in the medieval ‘Triple Contract’; 
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the tranching of securities, associated with modern Collateralised Debt Obligations, 
is present in medieval corpo/supra corpo structures; Bills of Exchange, forward 
contracts and options all existed by 1650. Historians are wary of making this type 
of comparison across time. The approach is justified here on the basis that the argu-
ment is that the nature of the contracts as material ‘things’ has not changed but the 
understanding of them in terms of mathematics and ethics have changed radically. 
The paper argues that pre-modern ethics are vestigial in the contemporary financial 
mathematics of the FTAP.
On the basis of this observation about mathematical probability, the paper focuses 
on the role of finance in stimulating mathematical ideas. Financial practice is closely 
related to quantification and, then, the mathematisation of society that resulted in the 
replacement of the moral/subjective approach to handling uncertainty with the pru-
dential objective approach. The relationship began in classical Greece. Netz (2002) 
discusses how money, as a counter, stimulated the development of numeracy and 
how numeracy impacted political decision making. Seaford (2004) makes a more 
extensive argument that the widespread use of money by the Greeks enabled them 
to abstract from the concrete to the imaginary and promoted individualism while 
a communal attitude to money ensured that society remained cohesive. A conse-
quence of these ideas is found in the Platonic view of justice that was employed in 
Aristotle’s consideration of commercial exchange in Nicomachean Ethics.
The impact that finance had on the development of western science is a funda-
mental idea underpinning this paper. The general idea can be traced to Franz Bork-
enau’s Der Ubergang vom feudalen zum bürgerlichen Weltbild of 1934, in the mid-
dle of a decade that saw a series of important works on the development of science. 
Hadden (1994) presents a summary of the origins of Borkenau’s theory, its decline 
and re-emergence, in the introduction to his development of Borkenau’s thesis. In 
summary, Hadden writes that Borkenau took a Marxist perspective and argued
The proliferation of commodity exchange in early modern Europe – the com-
parison of dissimilar goods and of the different labours contained in each 
for the purpose of reckoning up value – provided a model [Vorbild] for what 
[Borkenau] terms “the mathematical mechanistic world picture.” The reduc-
tion of social relations to the value of commodities and the calculation this 
value paralleled, and was extended to, the reduction of nature to body and the 
calculation of the motion of bodies. (Hadden 1994, p. xi)
Part of the liberal response to fascism and communism from the late 1930s was 
the ‘Whig’ interpretation that presented the development of western science as a 
consequence of Protestant reason to counter Marxists explanations, and, as a result, 
Borkenau’s thesis was largely ignored until it was republished in 1976. Kaye (1998) 
took a non-Marxist perspective on the thesis by focusing on a synthesis of medieval 
finance with the scholastic interpretations of Greek ideas carried in Nicomachean 
Ethics. This was in response to earlier work on the role of medieval universities in 
the emergence of western science by John E. Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla.
An important justification of the role of finance in stimulating modern science is 
that it provides an answer Needham’s question as to why European science overtook 
Islamic and Asian sciences in the early modern period. The claim is that in medieval 
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continental Europe there was, uniquely, a heterogeneity of money and prohibitions 
on usury. Together, these required merchants to model mathematically, particularly 
for the long-distance trade of ‘merchant adventurers’ and kaufman (as distinct from 
handler), and this mathematical world-view provided the basis for the mathematisa-
tion of science (Restivo 1982, p. 128; Hadden 1994, p. 84; Crosby 1997, pp. 69–74; 
Kaye 1998, pp. 1–10; Goetzmann 2004, pp. 203–275).
The work of Hacking, Daston and Kaye has been followed by work investigating 
the ethical origins of probability. Bellhouse (2005) considers Cardano’s Liber Ludo 
Aleae, of the mid-sixteenth century, by observing that earlier historians of probabil-
ity have found the work incoherent. Bellhouse argues that this apparent incoherence 
is a consequence of those historians examining the work in the context of modern 
probability theory. He finds it coherent if it is read as an attempt to establish the 
ethical basis of gambling. Sylla (2003, 2006) investigates the works of Pascal and 
Fermat, Huygens and Bernoulli in the seventeenth century. She notes that underpin-
ning all these works there is a basis in ethics. Like Bellhouse, she observes that the 
important final part of Ars Conjectandi, which introduces the Law of Large Num-
bers, seems incoherent in the context of the modern understanding of probability. 
As well as arguing that the work was inspired by Bernoulli’s religious beliefs, Sylla 
(2006, p. 27) highlights its problematic nature in that it discusses situations where 
the sum of probabilities is greater than one. This is a problem for objective prob-
ability but has a clear ethical interpretation, as this paper explains. The practical 
approach to probability is present in Laplace and Poisson but became obscured by 
objective probability, beginning with the widely read and influential works of de 
Moivre and Montmort, in the early eighteenth century, which developed probability 
independently of ethical considerations, as a problem of physica.
This paper does not aim to develop the paradigm that medieval finance stimulated 
the development of modern science or that commercial ethics inspired mathemati-
cal probability. Rather, in terms of Locke’s differentiation of knowledge, it seeks to 
address a problem implicit in Borkenau’s original thesis connected to the fact-value 
dichotomy. Specifically: does a reliance on mechanistic interpretations of phenom-
ena, in general, create problems in understanding social phenomena; does a focus on 
physica mean there is an inadequate understanding of practica?
The paper addresses this question based on the following understanding. 
Hirschman has argued that the achievement of Adam Smith, and the creation of 
capitalism, is in Smith’s synthesis of an incompatible pursuit of passions and inter-
ests into the monomania of wealth accumulation (Hirschman 1997, pp. 110–113). 
Smith’s synthesis can be seen as addressing Hume’s law: what ‘is’ cannot imply 
what ‘ought’ to be because material money, what ‘is’, can measure the ‘right’, what 
‘ought to be’. This is related to utilitarian/consequentialist morality and is the basis 
of the orthodox economic paradigm, and principle moral imperative, of maximis-
ing expected utility. Smith’s observation, when taken in isolation, conforms to the 
teleological materialism of both Marxism and liberal scientific positivism. However, 
it diverges from Aristotle’s teleology, the pursuit of eudaimonia, because in Aristo-
tle’s conception, moral goods are not commensurable, hence morality is not part of 
episteme. A consequence of this divergence is the post-Enlightenment focus on the 
materiality of physica while neglecting the social relations underpinning practica.
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A conventional refutation of Hume’s Law is in discursive ethics (MacIntyre 
1959). This is reflected in this paper employing Habermas’ Theory of Communica-
tive Action (1985), which directly addresses the problem that the scientific advances 
of the eighteenth century resulted in the catastrophes of twentieth century totalitari-
anism. As a result, central to the paper is that financial markets are viewed as discur-
sive arenas aimed at agreeing on the price of an asset in a radically uncertain world. 
In this sense, a quoted price is a statement and must conform to the principles of 
communicative action. This points to thinking of money as being part semeiotika 
rather than physica: it is a language rather than a thing. This view is rooted in Mon-
tesquieu’s conception of ‘ideal’ money as the sign and representative of things while 
everything is a sign and representative of money (Montesquieu 1752, p. 408). Wil-
liam James, making a connection between money and language, argued that “Our 
thoughts and beliefs ‘pass’, so long as nothing challenges them, just as bank-notes 
pass so long as nobody refuses them.” (James 1907, p. 207). Another observation 
supporting this approach is in de Finetti’s use of “Pr” to represent ‘probability’, 
‘price’ or ‘prevision’, signifying a correspondence between probabilities, which 
according to de Finetti do not exist, and prices. More recently, Shell has examined 
the connections between money and language (Shell 1982), but the focus on litera-
ture, as distinct from science, is not particularly relevant here.
The underlying thesis of the paper is regressive in the sense that it rejects the 
modern assumption that moral right can be justified through the anticipated accu-
mulation of money. Implicit in the paper is the assumption that judgement must be 
based as much on practica as on physica, as recognised in an Aristotelian frame-
work and the overall argument relates to Anscombe’s (1958) observation that mod-
ern, consequentialist, ethics are inadequate in the face of radical uncertainty, since 
consequences cannot be foreseen. However, the paper recognises that the Aristo-
telian framework, that excludes mathematics from ethical judgement is also inad-
equate, hence the reliance on Locke’s physica/practica/semeiotika in order to cre-
ate room for mathematics. The paper is interested in how finance is represented 
mathematically and how the mathematical tools are socially constructed based on 
the practica of financial contracts; how norms—rules that guide behaviour: part of 
practica—emerge out of practice and become formulated as explicit rules or princi-
ples—expressed through of semeiotika—because they work (Brandom 1994, p. 21).
Combining this approach with Locke’s categorisation of knowledge means that 
the paper understands financial contracts in three dimensions. They are ‘things’ 
that are known through physica. They are also understood through semeiotika, the 
mathematical models that represent value and the prices quoted. Finally, financial 
contracts should be understood in terms of practica. It needs to be emphasised that 
financial contracts should not be considered exclusively in terms of either physica, 
practica or semeiotika, rather the different perspectives interact: to quote Locke “All 
that can fall within the range of human understanding is in three categories. The 
nature of things as they are in themselves, their relations, and their manner of opera-
tion.” (Locke 1690, p. 21.1)
The contribution of the paper is to employ the idea that ethics are embedded 
into mathematics used in valuing financial contracts to understand the relationship 
between markets employing ‘dual quoting’ and the Dutch Book Argument. In this 
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case it is again argued that financial practices inform mathematical representations 
and, furthermore, the ethics underpinning those practices are important in contem-
porary applications of the mathematics. This argument is based on the idea that eth-
ics are implicit to the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing, which is a conse-
quence of Kolmogorov’s abstract axiomatisation of probability.
Kolmogorov’s axiomatisation of probability (Kolmogorov 1933) was formulated 
with little reference to the application of either objective or subjective probability to 
phenomena. After Kolmogorov received his doctorate, he was given permission to 
visit France and Germany, returning to Moscow in 1931. Kolmogorov had become 
interested in probability, which had been an important topic in Russian mathematics 
at the end of the nineteenth century but peripheral in France and Germany, before he 
had left Russia. However, it is possible that his decision to focus on probability on 
his return had been motivated as much by politics as an interest in practical applica-
tions of mathematics. By the 1930s, Cantor’s theories dominated mathematics but 
most Marxist mathematicians, committed to materialism, rejected proofs that relied 
on ‘ideal’ entities that had no physical manifestation, such as trans-finite numbers. 
In 1930, Kolmogorov’s doctoral supervisor, Nikolai Luzin, was criticised for being 
too abstract and bourgeois in this context and he would be criminally convicted in 
1936 (Lorentz 2001, pp. 29–30). Kolmogorov’s decision to focus on probability 
might have satisfied his personal preference to develop an abstract Grundbegriffe, 
which would have been admired in France and Germany, under the constraints of 
‘Soviet’ mathematics, which required material foundations (Kendall et al. 1990).
In abstracting probability away from applications, it was quickly realised that 
Kolmogorov had resolved the objective/subjective distinction because Bayes’ Theo-
rem, associated with subjective probability, could be deduced from Kolmogorov’s 
axioms while the Grundbegriffe directly addressed the specific problem of manag-
ing infinite sets, an issue in the objective approach to probability (Reitz 1934). How-
ever, Kolmogorov’s abstract approach came in for criticism from a range of applied 
probabilists. Von Mises criticised Kolmogorov’s generalised framework as unneces-
sarily complex (von Mises 1982, p. 99) while Kendall argued that abstract meas-
ure theory failed “to found a theory of probability as a branch of scientific method” 
(Kendall M. G. 1949, p. 102). De Finetti was suspicious of trans-finite mathemat-
ics, from a Machian empiricist perspective rather than a Marxist one, and preferred 
probability founded on finite additivity rather than countable additivity (Bingham 
2010, p. 5). More recently, Jaynes has championed Savage’s subjectivist approach in 
comparison to Kolmogorov’s measure theoretic approach as having a “deeper con-
ceptual foundation which allows it to be extended to a wider class of applications, 
required by current problems of science” (Jaynes 2003, p. 655). The objections to 
the abstract nature of measure theoretic probability for empirical scientists can be 
accounted for as a lack of physicality, or not being concerned with the ‘nature of 
things’. However, Kolmogorov’s approach is more general, and this lack of physi-
cality means that probability can be applied to abstract concepts. Kolmogorov had 
separated the mathematical representation of probability from specific applications, 
whether they related to either physica or practica (Snell 1997, pp. 304–305). On this 
basis, the paper categorises Kolmogorov’s approach to probability as neither subjec-
tive nor objective but as semeiotika.
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3  The foundations of mathematical probability in commercial ethics
In Catholic Europe, between 950 and 1250 CE, the population doubled while the 
amount of coin circulating increased six-fold (Pounds 1994, pp. 40–124); (Kaye 
1998, pp. 15–16; Nicholas 2006, p. 72). This monetisation signified a shift in 
commercial practice as transactions became abstracted from commodity for com-
modity exchange to commodity for money. In Italy, twenty-eight cities issued 
their own currency at one time or another (Goetzmann 2004, p. 18), while the 
French King minted the Livre Tournais and Livre Parisies in competition. Typical 
commercial projects, such as an Italian cloth merchant buying wool and selling 
cloth, could involve at least five currencies (Crosby 1997, p. 201). Coins were 
often debased, by counterfeiters or states, so merchants had to deal with the vari-
ability of the value of currency as well as fluctuations in the supply and demand 
of commodities. Hence, the heterogeneous monetisation of Medieval Europe not 
only involved abstraction but also created a commercial environment where there 
were no stable relationships that could be relied on by merchants (Crosby 1997, 
pp. 205–210; Goetzmann 2004, p. 19).
To facilitate long-distance trade, monetisation developed into financialisation 
as specie was replaced by contract. The Bill of Exchange, combining contracts 
for forward delivery and foreign exchange, emerged and would remain the prin-
ciple commercial contract well into the twentieth century. Practices associated 
with the financial crises of 2007–2009 are evident in medieval finance. For exam-
ple, the basic structure of securitisation (the basis of ‘Mortgage Backed Securi-
ties’) consisting of; a loan backed by assets; the transformation of a variable cash 
flow into a constant one; and facilities for guaranteeing the constant cash flows, 
all featured in the ‘triple’ or ‘German’ contact that was banned by the Catholic 
Church in 1586 (Decock 2012). Collateralised debt obligations (CDO) existed in 
corpro/supracorpro structures that medieval merchant-bankers, such as the Fug-
gers, employed (Parker 1974, p. 554).
In 1202 CE, Fibonacci published the Liber Abaci, a manual providing mer-
chants with the mathematical tools to enable them to manage complex financial 
transactions. The Liber provided a focus for Abaco, or ‘rekoning’ schools that 
emerged to teach mathematical techniques to Europeans that had been devel-
oped to the east and south of the Mediterranean (Høyrup 2014). These taught 
merchants mathematical techniques that supported abstracting from concrete 
commodities into quantified prices and helped them to understand the changing 
relationships between the different currencies (Crosby 1997, pp. 72–74). Abaco 
trained merchants created a reservoir of mathematically literate people on which 
the scientific developments of the seventeenth century were built (Poitras 2000, 
pp. 22–29; Fibonacci and Sigler 2003, pp. 1–11; Heeffer 2008).
A related consequence of the monetisation of society was the Catholic Church’s 
elevation of usury into a mortal sin in 1179 CE, at the same time as exchange was 
being monetised, and Aristotle’s philosophy began to dominate Catholic thought. 
Usury and interest are distinct; usury is charging for the use of money whereas 
interest originates in the compensation for breaking a contract (a poena/ποινή) 
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(Poitras 2000, p. 87). Aristotle had condemned usury on the basis that money is 
‘barren’ (Politics, Book I, 10, no. 5, 1258b) unlike grain or livestock, which are 
productive. Hence a grain loan could always charge interest based on damnum 
emergens, lost production, or lucrum cessans, lost opportunities to profit, but a 
money loan would have to justify any interest charged. Around 1200, the scholas-
tic Peter the Chanter argued that “a buyer or a seller may be excused from usury 
if they expose themselves to the risk of receiving more or less” and some 40 years 
later Alanus Anglicus determined that turpe lucrum, the shameful profit of usury, 
did not exist if the future price of the goods was uncertain in the mind of the mer-
chant (Rothbard 1996, pp. 41, 45; Franklin 2001, p. 263). The Church’s attention 
to the issue of usury placed a constraint on financial practice and inhibited a care-
ful examination of uncertainty, since the charging of interest was only possible in 
the presence of uncertainty.
Albert the Great’s study of Nicomachean Ethics involved a synthesis of com-
mercial practice, mathematics and scholastic scholarship that would have impor-
tant consequences for European scientific thought. In Book V of Ethics Aristotle 
considered ‘Justice’ within a Platonic framework wherein it was considered to 
be the virtue that ensured a functionally differentiated system, such as a soci-
ety, worked well (Plato 1969, pp. 4.434a–c). Aristotle argued that exchange was 
essential in binding society together and, in order to deliver social cohesion, 
there needed to be equality in what was exchanged; it had to be a fair and clearly 
reciprocal arrangement: “there is no giving in exchange” (Aristotle 2011, pp. 
1133a1–1133a5; Aristotle 2011, pp. 1133a15–1133a30; Judson 1997). Aristotle 
then observed that “there would be no association without exchange, no exchange 
without equality and no equality without commensurability” (Aristotle 2011, pp. 
1133b15–1133b20). Aristotle had discussed measurement, necessary for com-
mensurability, in the Organon and claimed that a measure shared the same Sub-
stance as the subject of measurement. Albert realised that money, the measure 
employed in commerce, only occasionally shared the Substance of the measured 
and it was the Accidents, not the Substance, that were being quantified. This 
implied that different Substances could be commensurable; length and duration 
could be handled together just as arms of cloth, rolls of cotton and Pisan pounds 
were commensurable. These observations enabled a revolution in science that 
saw a novel integration of physics and mathematics, initiated by the Merton Cal-
culators and then developed by Buridan and Oresme prior to its full expression in 
Europe during the seventeenth century (Hadden 1994; Crosby 1997; Kaye 1998).
Medieval Europe’s commercial circumstances of heterogeneous currencies, 
changing their relationships constantly, in a financialised society, abstracting 
physical commodities into contracts, under Church scrutiny monitoring the usury 
laws, provided a vital environment for the development of European mathematics. 
Thomas Bradwardine, of the Merton Calculators, Copernicus, Mercator, Stevin, 
da Vinci and Gallileo all had an abaco based mathematical training, which had 
an impact on how they understood mathematics. Fibonacci introduced the use of 
Hindu/Arabic numerals to aid merchants. Stevin popularised the use of decimals 
that lead to the idea of a polynomial. The identification of the number e originated 
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in Bernoulli’s study of the growth rate of bank accounts. These are all examples 
of the impact of the synthesis of mathematics and finance in the abaco culture.
The financial practice of money abstracting from the concrete commodities 
combined with Albert’s realisation that money provided a universal measure also 
gave rise to the concept of mathematical probability. Albert’s student, Thomas 
Aquinas, examined the morality of exchange in the ‘Second part of the Second 
part’ of the Summa Theologica. Aquinas began by asking the question ‘Whether 
it is lawful to sell something for more than it is worth?’ and deduced that, as 
long as there is no fraud involved and an equality, required by Aristotle, between 
what is being exchanged is established, then there is no ethical problem (Aquinas 
1947, pp. Q77,1). Aquinas then discussed a specific question: ‘Whether the seller 
is bound to state the defects of the thing sold?’ and presented a well-known prob-
lem from stoic philosophy.
A grain merchant from Alexandria arrives at Rhodes, which is gripped by 
famine. The merchant knows that other merchants are following with plenti-
ful supplies of grain, though the town’s inhabitants do not know this. How 
should the merchant price the grain they have?
The classical argument was that the merchant should not charge the ‘market 
price’, given the knowledge of more supplies coming. Aquinas disagreed.
in the case cited, the goods are expected to be of less value at a future time, 
on account of the arrival of other merchants, which was not foreseen by 
the buyers. Wherefore the seller, since he sells his goods at the price actu-
ally offered him, does not seem to act contrary to justice through not stating 
what is going to happen. If, however, he were to do so, or if he lowered his 
price, it would be exceedingly virtuous on his part: although he does not 
seem to be bound to do this as a debt of justice. (Aquinas 1947, pp. Q77,3)
Aquinas’ justification was based on the observation that while the merchant may 
believe there are more grain shipments on the way, they do not know; the future 
is uncertain and this uncertainty creates the opportunity for profit in accordance 
with usury doctrine (Rothbard 1996, p. 53).
The ‘Spiritual Franciscan’ Pierre-Jean Olivi disagreed with Aquinas’ position. 
Olivi argued that the metaphysical probability of more grain arriving in Rhodes 
created an abstract expectation that was as important in market exchange as the 
concrete facts of the market prices. This was the basis of a significant conceptual 
leap: since these expectations where expressed as quantified prices, the implica-
tion was that probability, itself, was quantifiable (Kaye 1998, p. 119; Franklin 
2001, pp. 265–267).
Olivi and Aquinas were united in recognising that if a price was simply the 
‘market price’ or based on a calculation then personal responsibility was removed 
from economic activity. They recognised that merchants had to employ their rea-
son to guide their actions, meaning that a price needed to be just (Kaye 1998, p. 
25). The ‘just price’ was a nebulous ideal that guaranteed fairness in exchange 
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and was determined as much by morality as either market sentiment or calcula-
tion (Monsalve 2014).
This approach to probability, as a moral science concerned with establishing 
equality in exchange, persisted through to the early eighteenth century. Carda-
no’s mid-sixteenth century work on probability, Liber de Ludo Aleae, examined 
the morality of gambling on the basis of Nicomachean Ethics (Bellhouse 2005). 
Cardano sought to identify the equal conditions that ensured a gamble was just 
and realised that this could be done by counting the ways a player could win and 
comparing that number to the ways a player would lose. On this basis, he noted 
that the chance of rolling a six with a fair dice was one-in-six and so the winnings 
on a roll of six should equal six times the stake. If this equality was not main-
tained, then the gamble was unjust. After coming to these conclusions, Cardano 
noted that
These facts contribute a great deal to understanding but hardly anything to 
practical play
since his reasoning provided no concrete predications.
The canonical origin of mathematical probability is in the correspondence of 
1654 between Pascal and Fermat on the ‘Problem of Points’. This problem origi-
nated in the abaco tradition and related to understanding the just, ethically right, 
distribution of capital amongst partners if the partnership was forced to dissolve 
prematurely. In the context of contemporary mathematical finance, the Pascal-
Fermat solution is the same as using the Cox–Ross–Rubinstein model to price a 
digital call. The Problem of Points had been considered by Cardano, who mis-
counted the possible combinations of outcomes. Huygens also addressed it in the 
first published text on probability, Van Rekeningh in Spelen van Geluk (1657). 
Huygens highlighted the normative aspect of probability when he opened the text 
with the axiom,
I take as fundamental for such games that the chance to gain something is 
worth so much that, if one had it, one could get the same in a fair game, that 
is a game in which nobody stands to lose. (Hald 1990, p. 69)
Bernoulli’s Ars Conjectandi (1713) considered probability in terms of fairness 
(Sylla 2006) and the ‘moral’ approach to probability is evident in Laplace’s Essai 
philosophique sur les probabilités (1812) and Poisson’s Recherches sur la proba-
bilité des jugements en matiére criminelle et en matiére civile (1837).
The ‘objective’ approach to probability began to eclipse the ‘moral’ approach 
after it was introduced by de Moivre and Montmort in the second decade of the 
eighteenth century. While the early texts on probability were rooted in ideas of 
fairness and degrees of belief, objective approaches originated in gaming and 
focused on repeatable experiments in finite state spaces. The Rhodean merchant 
had a degree of belief; they could not ascertain the ‘physical’ probability of addi-
tional grain deliveries arriving.
The overshadowing of the practical approach to probability, addressing 
problems of moral judgement, by the physical approach, related to repeatable 
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experiments, is demonstrated in Todhunter’s A History of the Mathematical The-
ory of Probability from the time of Pascal to Laplace of 1865. Todhunter ignored 
Cardano’s 1564 discussion of probability and raised a problem with Ars Con-
jectandi, where Bernoulli discussed probabilities that did not sum to one. This 
is illogical in the objective conception of probability (Hald 1990, pp. 220–250) 
but meaningful, as will become clear in the next section, in the context of fair 
exchange (Sylla 2006, p. 28).
As late as 1975, Ian Hacking claimed that probability emerged ‘suddenly’ around 
1650 (Hacking, The emergence of probability 2006, p. 1). This fitted into Foucault’s 
theories that there was a radical break in European history at that time that saw an 
end to determinism (Hacking 2006, pp. x–xi). The problem, as James Franklin points 
out (Franklin 2001, pp. 330–331), is that there had to have been a working theory of 
probability before 1650 because communities of merchants had been pricing alea-
tory contracts. The lack of evidence for the theory before 1650 is indicative of sev-
eral factors. Firstly, Olivi’s works were supressed after 1326 and his observations on 
probability and commerce only came to light in the twentieth century. In addition, 
merchants needed to be wary of broadcasting their methods for pricing contracts 
in case they revealed profits that would have been declared usurious, as happened 
to the ‘triple contract’. Calvinism’s tolerance of usury enabled more open discus-
sion of probability in Calvinist jurisdictions (Poitras 2000, p. 30; Rothbard 1996, pp. 
140–143; Daston 1998, pp. 172–174). Finally, Cardano’s work on probability was 
presented during a period, marked by the careers of the abaco trained Lucca Pacioli 
and Simon Stevin, when ideas were being transferred from the vernacular into the 
academic, where they were recorded and disseminated through printing (Bellhouse 
2005, p. 184; Poitras 2000, pp. 132–132; Dear 2009, p. 17).
4  The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing
A consequence of Kolmogorov’s theory of probability is the Fundamental Theorem 
of Asset Pricing. It consists of two statements, (Shreve 2004, p. 5.4)
1. A market admits no arbitrage, if and only if, the market has a martingale measure.1
2. Every contingent claim can be hedged, if and only if, the martingale measure is 
unique.
The theorem emerged between 1979 and 1983 as Michael Harrison (Harrison and 
Kreps 1979; Harrison and Pliska 1981, 1983) sought to establish a Grundbegriffe 
for the Black–Scholes–Merton (BSM) methodology for pricing options (MacKenzie 
2008, pp. 140–141), which had been introduced in 1973 (Black and Scholes 1973; 
Merton 1973).
1 The term ‘risk-neutral pricing measure’ is sometimes used in preference to the ‘martingale measure’, 
particularly outside of mathematics.
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BSM had been developed at a time when derivative (option) pricing was a rel-
atively unimportant activity. Gambling legislation in the United States meant that 
derivatives were only traded on ‘deliverable’ assets, principally agricultural com-
modities, and these markets were stagnant (MacKenzie 2008, pp. 142–145). How-
ever, following fundamental shifts in global economic relationships the Bret-
ton–Woods system of fixed exchange rates collapsed in August 1971. In order to 
control fluctuating currency values, governments adjusted interest rates while the 
fluctuating currencies resulted in volatile commodity prices. Options, which have 
been a feature of financial practice since the seventeenth century and were widely 
traded before the suspension of the European financial markets during the First 
World War, re-emerged as a tool to manage the risks associated with randomly fluc-
tuating prices.
Despite the financial rational for options, their legitimacy with regard to gam-
bling legislation was still ambiguous. The introduction of BSM in 1973 delivered 
a mathematical equation that defined the price of an option in terms of parameters 
known, in the sense of statistical confidence. This implied that option prices could 
be inferred and hence trading in them was not a form of gambling (MacKenzie 
2008, p. 158).
The effort by Harrison and his collaborators to create a Grundbegriffe was suc-
cessful and opened finance to investigation by pure mathematicians (Schachermayer 
1984; Delbaen and Schachermayer 1994, 1998) and by 2000, any mathematician 
working on asset pricing did so within the context of the FTAP. While the FTAP is 
important in mathematics, it is not well known in finance or economics. Practition-
ers focus on the models that are a consequence of the Theorem while social scien-
tists focus on the original Black–Scholes–Merton approach as an exemplar.
From the mid-1980s, some practitioners had become sceptical as to the validity 
of the prices produced by their models (Miyazaki 2007, pp. 409–410; MacKenzie 
2008, p. 248). The market-crash of 1987 was seen as confirming this scepticism and 
today the BSM equation is used to measure market volatility, a proxy for uncer-
tainty, from prices rather than to calculate the prices using observed parameters.
Despite its decline in relevance in financial practice, the status of the BSM 
model as an exemplar in financial economics was enhanced by the development of 
the FTAP. This was because the FTAP, which originated in BSM, unifies different 
approaches in financial economics. The clearest example of this synthesis was that 
the Radon-Nikodym derivative, a mathematical object employed in the FTAP, con-
nected the stochastic calculus Merton had employed in his proof and the market-
price of risk (Sharpe ratio), underpinning the approach Black and Scholes had taken. 
Without the FTAP, the two approaches appeared incongruous (MacKenzie 2003a, b, 
p. 834). Overall, the FTAP brings together a number of different financial methods 
or theories: Merton’s approach employing stochastic calculus advocated by Samu-
elson; CAPM, developed by Treynor and Sharpe; martingales, a mathematical con-
cept employed by Fama in the development of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis; and 
the idea of incomplete markets, introduced by Arrow and Debreu.
While the proof of the FTAP in its full expression (Delbaen and Schacher-
mayer 1998) is sophisticated, its essence can be understood in terms of a simple, 
single period, binomial model of a market, which Pascal and Fermat would have 
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comprehended, given that their solution to the ‘Problem of Points’ was based on a 
multi-period binomial model.
The concept of ‘no arbitrage’ is at the heart of the FTAP. The word ‘arbitrage’ 
derives from ‘arbitration’ (Oxford English Dictionary) and the idea was presented in 
Fibonacci’s Liber Abaci
20 arms of cloth are worth 3 Pisan pounds and 42 rolls of cotton are similarly 
worth 5 Pisan pounds; it is sought how many rolls of cotton will be had for 50 
arms of cloth. (Fibonacci and Sigler 2003, p. 180)
The equivalence of rolls of cotton to arms of cloth is established through the arbitra-
tion, or ‘mediation’ (Aristotle 2011, pp. 1133a19–20) of Pisan pounds and by apply-
ing Euclid’s First Common Notion (if A = B and A = C then B = C). In the context of 
finance, from as early as the late seventeenth century and de Witt’s Waerdye van Lyf-
renten Naer Proportie van Los-Renten of 1671, this has been known as the ‘Law of 
One Price’, which states that two assets delivering identical cash-flows in the future 
must have the same price today.
When there is a temporal separation of cash-flows in finance, as there will be in 
a single period model, which starts at time t = 0, and ends at time t = T>0, the ‘time 
value of money’ needs to be accounted for. The value of money declines as a conse-
quence of its devaluation, for example through its dilution by the minting authority. 
This creates a distinction between the nominal value of a unit of currency (which 
decays) and its real value (which is constant).
If an asset is guaranteed to pay out, at time T, an amount X (real value) then it 
must cost X today, otherwise the Law of One Price is breached or, logically, it is 
being argued that X ≠ X . If it was the case that the asset could be brought for y < X , 
the logical course of action would be to buy the asset at time t = 0 in order to make 
a profit of X − y > 0 , at time T. This would be an ‘arbitrage profit’ and its existence 
means the market admits arbitrage. Alternatively, if the asset was being traded for 
z > X , the logical course of action would be to sell the asset, at time t = 0, and make 
an arbitrage profit of z − X > 0 , at time T. The ability to make an arbitrage profit 
assumes that the market allows anyone to either buy or sell any quantity of any asset 
in the market. This is a significant assumption, which will be discussed in the next 
section, and means that the market is ‘liquid’.
The binomial model is more complex. The initial asset price is still the amount X 
but now the asset is guaranteed to be worth (pay-out) either Xu or Xd (in real terms), 
and that, without loss of generality, Xu > Xd . Both outcomes are possible but each 
with an unknown probability. If Xu = X , then buying the asset at time t = 0 for X 
would result in a profit of 0 if the asset turned out to be worth Xu and Xu − Xd > 0 
if the asset turned out to be worth Xd . Since the value Xd is possible, however small 
the probability, then a strategy of buying the asset at time t = 0 and then selling it in 
the future will provide a positive expected profit, with there being a guarantee of no 
loss. This represents an arbitrage. Similar arguments imply that, for there to be no 
arbitrages, Xd < X < Xu . An arbitrage presents a riskless profit and, therefore, would 
have been regarded as turpe lucrum by the scholastics.
Into the market, free of arbitrage opportunities, a derivative is introduced. A 
derivative is another liquid asset whose price is deterministically determined, at time 
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T, by the price of the underlying asset ( Xd or Xu ); if the asset price is Xu then the 
derivative is guaranteed to be worth f u (real terms); if the asset price is Xd then the 
derivative is guarantee to be worth f d (real terms). Since Xd and Xu are known at 
time t = 0, then so are f d and f u . The problem that the FTAP addresses is: what is 
the correct price for the derivative at time t = 0, when the asset price is X.
The original, monomial, model was solved on the basis that there was certainty at 
time T; to resolve the binomial model the approach is to make the outcome, at time 
T, certain. This can be done if all the assets are liquid so that any quantity of any 
asset can be bought or sold in the market. This means that we can construct a portfo-
lio made up of one unit of the derivative and  units of the underlying such that
This implies that, for there to be certainty at time T,
Since there is certainty at time T, the principle of no arbitrage/Law of One Price 
requires that
This expression can be solved for the one unknown, f  , to yield
Writing
it is clear that
while the no arbitrage condition means that 0 < qu, qd < 1 . On this basis we have
We can regard qu as representing the probability, in the sense of Kolmogorov’s 
Axioms, of the asset price being Xu at time T, while qd represents the probability that 
the asset price becomes Xd . The probability system defined by qu and qd is the mar-
tingale measure, sometimes known as the risk neutral pricing measure. Furthermore
or
f d + Xd = f u + Xu.
 =
f u − f d
Xd − Xu
.
f + X = f d + Xd(= f u + Xu)
(.)f = X
u − X
Xu − Xd
f d +
X − Xd
Xu − Xd
f u
Xu − X
Xu − Xd
= qd and
X − Xd
Xu − Xd
= qu
qu + qd = 1
f = quf u + qdf d
≡ EQ
[
f
]
.
X = quXu + qdXd
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and qu represents the location of X between Xd and Xu . If qu ∉ ]0, 1[ then X < Xd 
or X > Xu . The martingale measure only exists as a probability measure, satisfying 
Kolmogorov’s Axioms, if the no arbitrage condition, Xd < X < Xu , holds true. This 
is the meaning of the first statement of the FTAP.
The second statement of the FTAP can be understood by extending the sin-
gle period binomial model into a single period trinomial model and using a spe-
cific example. Consider the situation where the asset’s initial price is X = 2 and 
in the future, at time T, the value of the asset will take on one of three values: 
Xu = 3,Xm = 2,Xd = 1 . Into this market a derivative is introduced that pays out: 
f u = 1, f m = 0, f d = 0 at time T (in finance this represents a “call option with a 
strike 2”). The question remains: what is the correct price of f  at time t = 0, when 
X = 2?
The problem the trinomial model presents is that there is not a unique value of 
 , the holding in the underlying asset X , that will make the value of a portfolio 
consisting of the derivative and the holding at time t = T the same across all three 
states. We have
On this basis, equating the ‘up’ and ‘middle’ states yields  = −1 , equating 
the ‘middle’ and ‘down’ states yields  = 0 , while equating the ‘up’ and ‘down’ 
states yields  = −1∕2 . This problem is known as ‘incompleteness’.
The solution is to maintain the essential idea that the market should preclude 
arbitrages; equivalently, there must be a martingale measure. The martingale 
measure represents the probability of being in a specific state in the future, and so 
applies to all assets in the market, including the underlying asset. This means that
since the probabilities of each state should satisfy Kolmogorov’s Axioms. For the 
underlying asset
since the martingale measure applies to assets, specifically
Combining the two equations yields
The derivative, f  , can be priced using by choosing any value for qm = qd pro-
viding qm ∈
(
0,
1
2
)
 . For example, if qm = qd = 1∕4 , then 
f = quf u + qmf m + qdf d = 1∕4 ; if qm = qd = 0.35 , then f = 0.35 . The consequence 
X = Xd + qu
(
Xu − Xd
)
f u + Xu = 1 + 3, f m + Xm = 2, f d + Xd = 
qu + qm + qd = 1,
quXu + qmXm + qdXd = X,
3qu + 2qm + qd = 2.
qm = 1 − 2qd and 0 < qm = qd < 1∕2.
 Synthese
1 3
of incompleteness is that derivatives cannot be priced precisely, the theorem can 
only provide a range of possible prices.
Introducing, and pricing, the asset f  ‘completes’ the market and there are now 
three equations: the one relating to Kolmogorov’s Axioms; one relating to X ; and 
one relating to f  , and three unknowns, qu, qd, qm , and so Cramer’s Rule ensures 
that there is a unique solution for the three probabilities and assets can be priced 
precisely.
These arguments have been made with reference only to real values. In the 
more realistic situation where there is ‘time value of money’, an asset is cho-
sen to be the ‘numeraire’ and all other assets are priced in terms of the nume-
raire. The nominal price of any asset in any state is divided by the price of the 
numeraire asset in that particular state, giving ‘real’ prices. The condition that 
qu + qm + qd = 1 arises because the real price of the numeraire asset in all states 
is one. On this basis, in a single period model, as long as there are as many assets 
in a market as uncertain states of the world, then the market is complete, and all 
assets can be precisely priced. Completeness is not a consequence of no arbitrage 
and vice versa: a market can be complete or incomplete and admit arbitrages or 
incomplete or complete and be arbitrage free.
The idea of complete and incomplete markets was introduced into econom-
ics in the 1950s in a series of papers by Arrow, Debreau and McKenzie (Arrow 
and Debreau 1954; McKenzie 1959; Arrow 1964). The arguments centred on lin-
ear algebra and the relative number of traded assets to, random, future states of 
the market. This led to the attitude amongst policy makers that creating more 
traded assets would improve economic welfare and played a role in justifying 
the ‘financialisation’ of advanced economies from the 1980s. In the context of 
the FTAP, the principle source of incompleteness is the existence of transaction 
costs, known as ‘frictions’ that mean, for example, the buying and selling costs 
are unequal. As well as assuming that the market being considered is liquid and 
frictionless, an assumption is also made that a market is efficient, that all parties 
in the market have access to the same information. Financial regulation can be 
designed to promote market efficiency and, to a lesser extent, ensure liquidity, but 
there will always be frictions and so derivatives, in practice, can never be priced 
precisely.
The justification for the FTAP is explained in terms of trading activity in a 
liquid market. Say that, in the preceding example, the derivate is introduced and 
priced at f = 1
4
 , setting qm = qd = 1
4
, qm =
1
2
. A third asset is introduced to the 
market that pays out: gu = 4, gm = 2, gd = 1 at time T. The no-arbitrage price of 
this asset is given by
If the party who introduces this asset prices it at g = 21
2
 instead, above the no-
arbitrage, ‘fair’, price it has the potential to offer excess profits. The explanation 
why this would not occur is that, since the market is liquid, other traders in the 
market can sell this new asset, to the person who has introduced it, at price g = 21
2
 
g = qugu + qmgm + qdgd = 2
1
4
.
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yielding cash of 21
2
 . They can then use this money to buy the underlying asset, X , 
and derivative, f  , for a total cost of 21
4
 , meaning they are left with a net income of 
1
4
 . At the end of the period, this portfolio will deliver a pay-out in the ‘up’ state of 
4; in the ‘middle’ state, 2; and in the ‘down state’, 1. However, by selling the new 
asset they are obliged to pay to the person they sold the asset 4 in the ‘up’ state; 2 
in the ‘middle’ state and 1 in the ‘down’ state. These payments cancel each other 
but the trader still holds the 1
4
 earned in creating the initial portfolio, or strategy. 
This is the arbitrage profit the trader has gained, at the expense of the person who 
sought to make an arbitrage profit by mis-pricing in the first place. If the market 
was as economists expect, then the traders selling the new asset, at g = 21
2
 , and 
buying the original assets will move the relative prices until there are a coherent 
set of probabilities, qu, qd, qm , that defined the martingale measure.
The account presented relates to the most trivial markets imaginable but the 
FTAP has been shown to hold in the most complex situations that are amenable to 
stochastic analysis. While the proof is based on a hedging argument and the Law of 
One Price, employed in the original 1973 papers, it is now understood there are situ-
ations where the hedging argument cannot be employed, such as if a price process 
is given by a jump diffusion, yet the FTAP holds and the existence of the martingale 
measure ensures there are no arbitrages (Cont and Tankov 2004, p. 10.5.2). This 
implies that in the mathematics (semeiotika) there is something beyond the material 
act of hedging (physica) underpinning the theory.
Vestiges of scholastic financial ethics can be found in the FTAP. In the first state-
ment, the martingale measure creates an equality between the price paid and the 
future worth of the asset, making the exchange reciprocal. The no arbitrage condi-
tion, which is equivalent to the existence of the martingale measure, prohibits the 
earning of a guaranteed, risk-less, profit that would have been regarded as usurious, 
turpe lucrum, by scholastics. The opening statement of the Black and Scholes paper, 
and the conception of the FTAP, is the observation that “it should not be possible 
to make sure profits” (Black and Scholes 1973). This was rooted in Knight’s (1921) 
argument that profits were derived from uncertainty, which had been presented as 
an amoral fact. The religious injunction against usury has morphed into a statement 
of scientific impossibility. The second statement of the FTAP establishes that mani-
fested markets are incomplete. This means that a price of an asset in a market can 
never be known precisely and market participants must always employ judgement, 
as advocated by the scholastics.
The observation that the FTAP can be mapped onto scholastic doctrine relating 
to the ethics of commerce does not mean that the FTAP is an expression of those 
ethics. Rather, it highlights how the contemporary mathematical representation of 
exchange still carries vestiges of ethical ideas that had originally generated probabil-
ity, the means through which mathematics represents uncertainty. This illuminates 
two points. Firstly, how semeiotika is constructed from practica, as well as physica, 
and that mathematics can represent moral principles.
On this basis, the FTAP can be understood in several ways. It can be proved 
mathematically as a result of stochastic analysis independent of a financial context 
(semeiotika), though the financial motivation is important. It can be explained more 
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heuristically as a consequence of rational traders operating in a competitive financial 
market (physica), as is usually done amongst practitioners. Or, it can be understood 
from the perspective of scholastic ethics (practica), where usury is prohibited and 
merchants must exercise their judgement in manifested, incomplete, markets. The 
ethical argument is as irrelevant to the mathematician as a mathematical argument is 
to an ethicist. Only when the financial argument is made, both the mathematical and 
ethical aspects are present. The utility of including the ethical perspective is that it 
explains mathematical results that cannot be accounted for in terms of the, material, 
hedging argument (such as in the case of jump-diffusions).
5  Jobbers: justifying theorems
The first statement of the FTAP is related to the Dutch Book Argument (DBA) 
(Skyrms 1984, p. 21; Hàjek 2009). The DBA was introduced into philosophy in a 
passing remark in Ramsey’s Truth and Probability (Ramsey 1931), which was a 
response to Keynes’ A Treatise on Probability. Keynes (1921) had observed that in 
some cases cardinal probabilities of events could be deduced, in others, ordinal prob-
abilities—one event was more likely than another—could be inferred, but there were 
a large class of problems that were not reducible to the concept of probability. This 
tripartite separation echoes Aristotle’s understanding that there were three classes of 
phenomena: events that were determined (the development of a bird embryo); those 
that were predictable (the weather) and those not amenable to science (the discovery 
of buried treasure). Keynes’ argument was challenged by Ramsey who argued that 
probability relations between a premise and a conclusion could always exist (Ram-
sey 1931; Ramsey and Mellor 1980; Davis 2004; Edgington 2012).
Ramsey defined ‘probability’ as ‘a degree of belief’ and noted that a standard 
way of measuring these was through betting odds (Ramsey 1931, p. 171). On this 
basis, he formulated laws of probability, finishing with the observation that
These are the laws of probability, … If anyone’s mental condition violated 
these laws, his choice would depend on the precise form in which the options 
were offered him, which would be absurd. He could have a book made against 
him by a cunning better and would then stand to lose in any event. (Ramsey 
1931, p. 182)
While Ramsey did not develop this statement, de Finetti did (de Finetti 1980) and it 
became the most famous justification of the Bayesian/subjective thesis that rational 
beliefs should conform to the axioms of probability (Hàjek 2009, pp. 173–174).
Through the 1980s and 1990s, as the FTAP was being developed, the DBA was 
stimulating discussion. An objection to the DBA is that, in practice, there are no 
‘bookies’ that can compel someone to bet on their beliefs (Armendt 1993, p. 3; 
Christensen 1996, p. 451). This requirement is equivalent to the liquid markets 
assumption in the FTAP. In the FTAP, this is based on the reality of finance market 
practice and this practice plays a fundamental role in enabling Bayesian/subjective 
probability by justifying the DBA.
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Financial markets are built on two distinctive institutions: brokers and ‘jobbers’ 
(in the UK), ‘market makers’ or ‘dealers’ (in the US). Broker mediated markets are 
the standard form of market exchange and are the focus of most economic theories. 
Retail shops are brokers bringing consumers and producers together and typically 
charge a commission of 100%; auctioneers charge both sellers’ and buyers’ commis-
sions running at 10–20% each; real estate agents charge 0.5–3%; modern financial 
exchanges charge a fraction of a percentage commission. Brokers act on behalf of 
property owners. In financial markets, they work for investors who make prudent 
assessments as to the value of different assets and on that basis hold them for the 
long term. Current financial exchanges are essentially computer systems that take 
investors buy and sell orders and electronically match them at the best price through 
a ‘double auction’; they act as mechanical brokers. Thicke’s argument (2017) that 
market beliefs should be considered a type of collective belief is based on broker-
mediated markets.
During the development of modern financial markets, in early seventeenth cen-
tury Amsterdam and later seventeenth century London, property owners found that 
they could not rely on there being enough activity in the market to ensure they could 
buy or sell an asset when they wanted to; the market was illiquid. This problem 
of illiquidity was addressed by jobbers who ‘made the market’ (Poitras 2000, pp. 
288–293). Whereas brokers derive an income from the commission they charge to 
property owners, jobbers make their money by trading on their own account, look-
ing to buy an asset for less than they can sell it. This is made possible by in blanco 
trading, trading in abstracted contracts rather than physical commodities.
The practice of abstracting assets to contracts that stipulated ‘cash on delivery’ 
at a future date had become common in the thirteenth century and was standard by 
the seventeenth century. It enables a jobber, who anticipates a commodity’s price to 
fall, to enter into a contract to sell the asset at a specific location at a pre-determined 
price on a specific date. The jobber needs not be in possession of the asset, they only 
need to be able to deliver according to the terms of the contract. This is now known 
as ‘short selling’. Having ‘sold short’, the jobber will endeavour to enter into a sym-
metric contract to take delivery of, to buy, an identical asset at the same time and 
place before the agreed delivery date. This would be with another party but, hope-
fully, at a lower price.
Having entered into symmetric contracts, the jobber does not have to handle 
the physical asset, only the cash difference between the prices agreed on the date 
agreed. Financial markets developed based on jobbers ‘making the market’ by con-
stantly trading in blanco amongst themselves with brokers coming to the market as 
and when a property owner wished to trade the physical asset.
Since jobbers derive their income by buying and selling at different prices with-
out handling any physical commodity, they have developed a reputation for pro-
moting uncertainty and jobbing quickly developed a dubious position in society. In 
1719, Daniel Defoe described stock-jobbing in The Anatomy of Exchange Alley as
a trade founded in fraud, born of deceit, and nourished by trick, cheat, whee-
dle, forgeries, falsehoods, and all sorts of delusions; coining false news, this 
way good, this way bad; whispering imaginary terrors, frights hopes, expecta-
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tions, and then preying upon the weakness of those whose imaginations they 
have wrought upon. (Poitras 2000, p. 290)
Defoe also mentioned the diversity of jobbers, which was portrayed in Colley Cib-
ber’s 1720 play, The Refusal
There you’ll see a duke dangling after a director; here a peer and ‘prentice hag-
gling for an eighth; there a Jew and a parson making up the differences; there 
a young woman of quality buying bears of a Quaker; and there an old one sell-
ing refusals to a lieutenant of grenadiers. (Ackroyd 2001, p. 308)
While, in 1761, Thomas Mortimer made the point that there are different types of 
jobber: foreigners, gentry, merchants and tradesmen; and “by far the greatest num-
ber”, people
with very little, and often, no property at all in the funds, who job in them 
on credit, and transact more business in several government securities in one 
hour, without having a shilling of property in any of them, than the real propri-
etors of thousand transact in several years. (Poitras 2000, p. 291)
One important aspect of the way jobbers have been perceived comes from the fact 
that the financialisation of commodities into contracts enabled those without prop-
erty to engage in market speculation, often against the interests of the property 
owners.
For example, ‘ducaton’ shares appeared in the Netherlands in the early seven-
teenth century (Poitras 2000, pp. 276–277). These contracts had a nominal value of 
one tenth of a Dutch East India Company (VOC) share, but it was always understood 
that holding ten ducatons would not entitle someone to a VOC share. Ducatons 
emerged because, at the time, it was impossible for the general public to own VOC 
shares, which were held exclusively by the Dutch elite and their trading incurred 
substantial transaction costs. Ducatons provided a means through which the wider 
public could challenge the VOC owners’ assessment of the value of the firm. In 
response to these opinions being voiced, the VOC board petitioned the Dutch gov-
ernment to prohibit all in blanco trading in 1610. The ban was ineffective, and had 
to be repeated in 1624, 1630, 1636 and 1677.
A similar phenomenon, ‘bucketshops’, appeared in the USA in the late nine-
teenth century. Bucketshops essentially traded ducatons based on prices quoted on 
the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) or the New York Stock Exchange, again with-
out involving any claim on the actual asset. The bucketshops took trade away from 
exchanges and drew comparisons between the ‘reputable’ CBOT and the ‘disrep-
utable’ bucketshops in the context of, illegal, gambling. Between 1900 and 1905, 
CBOT was engaged in several court cases attempting to supress bucketshops (de 
Goede 2005, pp. 70–71). In the first of series of cases against a Missouri firm, a Chi-
cago judge ruled that the bucketshops were enabling gambling. In 1903, CBOT went 
to court again, in Missouri, and lost. The judge ruled that there was little difference 
between bucketshops and speculation on CBOT, apart from the wealth of CBOT 
members. CBOT took the case to the US Supreme Court in 1905 who ultimately 
ruled in favour of the CBOT making a distinction between ‘competent’ men—those 
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who had paid to be members of CBOT—and ‘irresponsible gamblers’ serviced by 
the bucketshops (de Goede 2005, p. 71).
To limit the ability of jobbers to manipulate markets, the practice emerged of job-
bers being required to simultaneously quote ‘bid’ prices, at which they would buy 
an asset, and ‘offer’ or ‘ask’ prices, at which they would sell, without knowing if the 
counter-party was seeking to buy or sell the asset—though the quantity would affect 
the quoted price. On this basis, the role of jobbers in the London markets became an 
established part of the financial system from the late eighteenth century. While their 
role was regularised, jobbers were still associated with outsiders of limited resources 
(Attard 2000, pp. 13–14; Mackenzie and Millo 2001, pp. 19–22). Following the ‘Big 
Bang’ reforms in the UK in 1986, the legally recognised distinctive role of jobbers 
disappeared, though the practice of dual-quoting and market-making still persist, 
particularly for ‘over the counter’ (OTC), specialised, trades conducted amongst 
investment banks. Today, however, the bulk of trading is conducted on electronic 
exchanges, broker-mediated markets, and regulators prefer centralising trades on 
public exchanges rather than in ‘opaque’, on account of them involving private bi-
lateral agreements, OTC markets based on dual quoting.
The effect of dual quoting can be appreciated by developing the problem of the 
Rhodean merchant. Say the merchant arrives on Rhodes during a thick sea-fog, 
which means inhabitants of the island can only see a few metres, whereas those at 
sea can see for kilometres. When the merchant arrives at Rhodes, they know that 
other ships are a few hours away, but cannot be seen by the Rhodeans on land. The 
merchant immediately goes to the market where they meet a Rhodean who asks for 
a price quote for grain for delivery in a few hours’ time. By this time, the other ships 
will have arrived. What price does the merchant offer? If the merchant was seeking 
to maximise their profit, as modern economic theory would argue, they would ask a 
high price; it was the Rhodean’s problem that they did not have the information on 
the coming cargoes. However, if the merchant was required to quote as a jobber and 
give a price at which they would buy grain as well as the price at which they would 
sell grain in a few hours, they would have to act differently. If the merchant quoted 
a high ask price with a small spread, so the bid price was also high, they would 
expose themselves to the risk that the Rhodean was aware of the coming shipments 
and would take the bid price, agreeing to sell the grain at a high price knowing that 
they would be able to deliver it out of stock from one of the arriving cargoes. The 
merchant is forced to quote a price that reflects what they know, in this case that in 
a few hours’ time the grain price would be low. They could do this by giving a large 
spread, bidding much lower than asking, or a small spread at a low ask price. In 
modern markets, a large spread can indicate either uncertainty or that the jobber is 
not interested in trading while a narrow spread indicates confidence in the price. The 
belief that jobbers promote uncertainty originates in the association of large spreads 
providing large profits for jobbers.
In respect of the DBA, the practice of dual quoting also means that Dutch Books 
and Czech Books (Hàjek 2008) are identical.
Jobbers do not like to hold positions (contracts to buy or sell in the future) for 
the long term. A jobber who has contractually agreed to buy an asset, taken a long 
position, will try and enter into a contract to sell, take a short position, in the same 
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asset as soon as they can. However, they may find the market has moved against 
them, for example the price may have fallen after they have entered a long position 
to buy at a pre-agreed fixed price. In order to close this disadvantageous position, 
they will quote an attractive price relative to the market and far from their originally 
contracted price. This has nothing to do with their valuation of the asset but rather 
is motivated by their wish to exit a bad position. It means that jobbers do not nec-
essarily believe the prices they quote but, never the less, the quotes are ‘reliable’. 
Dual-quoting guarantees this since the jobber’s “manifest intention is meant as it is 
expressed” (Habermas 1984, p. 99) because they are required to act on the prices 
they quote. Because jobbers are trading contracts, not physical assets, they can give 
price quotes without exposing themselves to dire consequences; the ability to close a 
disadvantageous position provides a means of forgiving mistaken beliefs.
The fact that jobbers might offer prices, make statements, that they do not believe 
in, undermines the idea of scientific realism and contributes to the dubious reputa-
tion of jobbers. However, the issue of a falsehood playing a role in guaranteeing 
reliability has been raised in connection with mathematical modelling of physical 
systems (Winsberg 2006) and the falsehood of jobbers’ quotes, which help deliver 
reliability, can be seen as analogous to the pragmatic falsehoods found in mathemat-
ical models.
Jobbers regard it as a sign of unprofessionalism to talk of ‘buying’ or ‘selling’ 
assets, since buying and selling implies a commitment to a physical asset rather than 
to the abstract process of pricing (Beunza and Stark 2012, p. 394). In effect, they 
should demonstrate a version of the virtue apatheia (ἀπάθεια). While this disinter-
est in the asset is often perceived as cynical the dual-quoting mechanism ensures the 
sincerity of their prices.
Evaluation is distinct from valuation (Aspers 2018). Evaluation is an objective 
assessment against a recognised standard. On this basis, pricing in the context of 
the FTAP is evaluative, assessing against the requirement to exclude arbitrage and 
so ensure reciprocity. Valuation is about individual preferences, rather than uniform 
standards. Jobbers are engaged in subjective valuation. The subjective nature of val-
uation makes it susceptible to problems arising out of differences in status that the 
practice of dual-quoting resolves. For example, Charlemagne set the price at which 
agricultural commodities could settle tax debts; the state was a fixed-price buyer. 
This meant that shortages would not be corrected by the market, since a merchant 
would face a certain loss of buying a commodity in an area of excess and then pay-
ing for it to be shipped to an area of shortage where they could only sell it at the 
purchase price. If Charlemagne was required to both buy and sell at the price he set, 
the problem of distribution would be solved. A contemporary luxury goods manu-
facturer would not be able to charge a ‘brand premium’ if they were required to buy 
identical products at the prices they charged.
The concept of utility presents itself in some discussions of the DBA (Armendt 
1993; Baccelli 2017). In the FTAP, utility plays only a peripheral role, being 
confined to problems relating to the choice of a single martingale measure in an 
incomplete market. The martingale measure, often referred to as a ‘risk neutral 
pricing measure’, removes the need to make adjustments for risk preferences, 
which is the role of utility functions in economics. One of the initial attractions of 
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the BSM approach to pricing derivatives was that it does not require the use of an 
unobservable utility function. In practice, the apatheia of jobbers combined with 
their habit of holding positions for short periods, such that price fluctuations are 
small, imply that jobbers’ utility functions, in relation to their trading activities, 
are linear. Economics retains utility functions because it is based on broker medi-
ated markets where property owners determine the prices they will accept on the 
basis of their utility functions. In the FTAP, a jobber selects a probability meas-
ure that defines how they price.
Replacing the need for choosing a utility function by choosing the correct 
measure is not original. The origin of utility theory in finance and economics is in 
the Petersburg Game, introduced in in 1713 in some correspondence between de 
Montmort and Nikolaus Bernoulli (Jorland 1987). The game is based on tossing 
a fair coin. The pot starts with 1. If the coin comes up heads, the player wins the 
pot, if it comes up tails the pot is doubled, and the coin tossed again. This rule is 
repeated until a heads comes up.
The problem for Bernoulli and Montmort was that mathematical probability 
argued that a game should have been valued by calculating the sum over all pos-
sible outcomes of the product of the payoff and its probability, the mathematical 
expectation. The Petersburg Game is designed so that the expectation is infinite, 
being a sum of an infinity of one halves. However, it was observed that nobody 
would stake more than 20 coins to play the game and typically they would only 
offer 4–6 coins to play.
Nikolaus Bernoulli argued that it was a ‘moral impossibility’ to win large 
sums. In 1728, Cramer offered an alternative explanation and argued that the root 
of the problem “comes from this; that the mathematicians estimate money in pro-
portion to its quantity, and men of good sense in proportion to the usage that they 
may make of it” (Pulskamp 1999, p. 4). In this sense, jobbers, whose stock in 
trade is money “estimate money in proportion to its quantity” where as investors 
estimate it “in proportion to the usage that they may make of it”, in terms of its 
utility. Cramer suggested that the marginal utility of money should diminish, an 
idea that Daniel Bernoulli then used to explain why people took out insurance in 
a paper published in 1738 (Bernoulli 1954) and the concept became widespread 
with the growth of Utilitarianism.
Daniel’s approach had been largely ignored in the eighteenth century. 
D’Alembert suggested that the game should end after the person doubling the pot 
was bankrupted. In 1777, Buffon took a practical approach to the problem and 
asked a young boy to conduct 2048 experiments of the Game and tabulated the 
results. He found that the total pay-out of the 2048 games was a little over 10,057 
coins, suggesting a fair price for the Game of around 5, close to the original 
observations of Nikolaus Bernoulli and Montmort. In 1781, Condorcet worked 
out that the value of the game was a function of the maximum number of times 
the gambler considered a head to come up in a row. If the gambler thought it 
was a ‘moral impossibility’ for n heads in a row then the expected value of the 
game was n
2
 (Jorland 1987, pp. 169–170). This meant that if a gambler considered 
events with chances less than 1 in 10,000 to be ‘morally impossible’, such as see-
ing 14 heads in a row, they would value the game around 6.5–7. The Petersburg 
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‘paradox’ can be explained in terms of subjective probability measures as coher-
ently as through subjective utility functions.
The flexibility of measure theoretic probability in addressing difficult problems 
in economics has also been shown in Brown and Rogers (2012). Here, the ideas 
underpinning the FTAP are used to argue that problems based on information asym-
metries might be more tractable by approaching them through measure changes 
rather than by modelling information.
Subjective probability is an important topic of mathematics since it provides a 
basis of modelling people’s beliefs about the future. The DBA has played a signifi-
cant role in justifying the connection between coherent (rational) beliefs and prob-
ability theory while the most famous justification for the DBA is founded on how 
financial markets operate.
6  The Communal Nature of Markets
A difference in discussions of Dutch Book Arguments compared to those relating 
to the FTAP is that the DBA focuses on an individual engaging with a ‘cunning 
bookie’ while the FTAP assumes individuals are part of a dynamic, jobber-medi-
ated, market. A jobber makes an assertion as to the future value of an asset by giving 
the market a bid and offer price. If other jobbers agree with the bid-offer, they let the 
quote pass and do nothing. If, however, another market-maker felt the jobber had 
mispriced the asset, they would challenge the assertion by buying at the quoted price 
if they thought the price was too low, or, selling at the quoted price if they believed 
it were too high. This process continues until there is a consensus in the market on 
the asset’s price, at which point ‘silence implies consent’ and the jobbers cease trad-
ing the asset. The process of how market-makers engage in reflexive modelling such 
that dissonances gives way to resonance is described in detail in Beunza and Stark 
(2012).
The financial institution of jobbing addresses issues relating to the practicality 
of someone being compelled to bet on their beliefs, central to the DBA. The FTAP 
employs the technology of measure theory to resolve additional issues raised in con-
nection with the DBA that have not be resolved through subjective approaches to 
probability, such as de Finetti’s or Jaynes’. For example, the problem of additivity 
(Armendt 1993; Williamson 1999) is solved by employing sigma-algebras, parti-
tions and the concept of measurability. The FTAP is concerned with the dynamics 
of prices whereas the DBA is focused on one or two step decisions, as is much of 
Bayesian analysis. As a result, the FTAP handles issues relating to diachronic Dutch 
Books and Fraassen’s ‘reflection’ (van Fraassen 1984, pp. 244–246) through the 
technology of filtrations and the Tower property of conditional expectation.
The dynamic nature of financial markets and the FTAP sheds light on another 
issue raised in connection with the DBA, that of an agent assigning a probability 
of less than one to a known logical, or tautological, truth (van Fraassen 1984, pp. 
239–242). This is possible in the basic DBA, which requires beliefs to be coherent 
but not necessarily correct. A financial market addresses both coherence and a form 
of correctness. If a jobber did not price a logical truth as having probability one, 
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they would create an arbitrage by representing a monomial situation by a binomial 
model. If this were the case, other jobbers would immediately perceive this quote 
as a mispricing. The demand for these contracts would indicate to the agent offer-
ing the arbitrage quotes that they had made an error in their assessment and, if they 
wished to carry on participating in the market, they should revise their beliefs, or be 
bankrupted.
The dynamic nature of asset pricing has played a role in the development of 
modern probability. Bachelier’s 1904 thesis, The Theory of Speculation, is often 
associated with Einstein’s discussion of Brownian motion of 1905. However, since 
Bachelier and Einstein were concerned with very different questions it is not rea-
sonable to suggest Bachelier pre-empted Einstein. Bachelier’s thesis was important, 
however, as it introduced Rayonnement de la probabilité (Radiation of probability) 
(Bachelier 2006, p. 40), the idea that a probability distribution could change in time, 
anticipating the Fokker–Planck/Kolmogorov Forward Equation (Taqqu 2001; Cour-
tault et al. 2000, p. 344).
A jobber-mediated market can be regarded as a dynamic social process wherein 
market participants are seeking “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed 
to by all who investigate” (Peirce 1934, p. 407). This pragmatic conception of truth 
rests on the idea of a ‘community’ that stands for the ‘all’ that comes to an agree-
ment (Peirce 1934, p. 311). While the DBA, and the FTAP, are concerned with 
establishing the objective coherence of an individual’s beliefs and the institution of 
jobbers delivers subjective reliability, a financial market is seeking to arrive at com-
munal agreement. This highlights that an individual’s beliefs can only be confirmed, 
or refuted, through discussion with others and is the essence of jobber-mediated 
markets (Muniesa 2007). This points to the idea that these markets operate as places 
where opinions—expressed as prices—are discussed and markets are ‘centres of 
communicative action’.
Two essential components of deliberation, whether in markets, democracies or 
scientific research, are that there is a plurality of views, to maximise the chance that 
the best solution is identified, and that views are challenged, and defended, without 
resorting to authority (Misak 2002). Financialisation enables these two features.
Financialisation involves the quantification of the commodity into a price. Money, 
the measure of price, must be fungible so that it does not take on the characteristics 
of the person who holds it. This impersonality of money means that it is universal 
and makes no distinctions; it is used by rich and poor. Money has the power to trans-
form objects; it can turn a cow into a car. These properties enable money to per-
form multiple functions simultaneously and its myriad uses means that it becomes 
a universal aim of all the members of the community using it (Seaford 2004, pp. 
149–172). On this basis, Adam Smith argued that all passions and interests can be 
represented by money (Hirschman 1997, pp. 110–113) and capitalism emerges, 
focussing on the accumulation of money as a store of wealth and unit of account.
The de-personalisation that comes about with the idealisation of money, away 
from a material ‘thing’, militates against power and status imbalances that are a 
potential problem in the valuation process (Aspers 2018, p. 141). Abstracting from 
the physical commodity into the abstract contract should, in principle, enable those 
without property to challenge the opinions, the price quotes, of those with power. 
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This has been demonstrated by ducaton shares and bucketshops and the relative sta-
tus of jobbers compared to investors. More generally, scholastics had observed in 
1305 that the power of the French king, Philip IV, could not force decrees on the 
market (Kaye 1998, pp. 24–26). Montesquieu, who understood the concept of arbi-
trage (Montesquieu 1752, pp. 407–425), noted that ideal money enabled people to 
avoid the ‘violence’ of the church and state and forced rulers to govern with greater 
prudence (Montesquieu 1752, p. 392). Financialisation has enabled minorities, such 
as European Jews or British Quakers, to prosper.
Financialisation also enables dual quoting, since a jobber can sell a representation 
of something they do not have and buy a representation of something they do not 
want. The ‘dual-quoting’ requirement forces jobbers to be sincere in their pricing 
while emasculating any power they might have through accumulated wealth. The 
jobber has little status or authority, only beliefs represented by traded contracts, and 
so disagreements cannot be resolved by force of authority.
Markets do not always deliver prices that accurately represent asset values. The 
most common manifestation of this failure is in the formation of ‘bubbles’. This can 
happen when there is irrational optimism regarding a particular asset, or class of 
assets, or because there is rational pessimism about all other asset classes. The prob-
lem of bubbles is still open and the jobbers’ maxim that the market can stay irra-
tional longer than they can stay solvent will be relevant so long as a correct minority 
cannot persuade a majority of their error. This is not just a feature of markets but is 
also evident in science and politics.
A broker-mediated market is concerned with the exchange of property, whereas 
a jobber-mediated market is concerned with price discovery. Financialisation ena-
bles jobber-mediated markets, though it is not a necessary requirement of broker-
mediated markets. Brokers deliver collective belief, based on agreement of a price at 
which an exchange takes place, money accounts for the concrete values of the com-
modities exchanged. Jobbers trade at a price that represents disagreement. Further-
more, since a jobber might not quote the price they believed represented the value of 
the asset and they never justify how they have come to offer their price, they cannot 
be said to be conveying knowledge as it is usually defined. This means that Thicke’s 
analysis of broker-mediated markets does not extend into jobber-mediated markets. 
Jobbers’ behaviour is more like what Thicke describes as ‘rejectionist’ rather than 
the ‘believers’, which is the focus of his analysis of broker-mediated markets (Thicke 
2017, p. 4).
The failure of Thicke’s analysis to translate from broker- to jobber-mediated mar-
kets can be explained in terms of uncertainty. Broker-mediated markets are con-
cerned with the physical exchange of assets; jobber-mediated markets are concerned 
with the pricing of abstract contracts relating to uncertain future events. A jobber-
mediated market should not exist for an asset where there is general agreement on 
its price. Such an asset would still be traded in a broker-mediated market, where one 
person’s utility for the asset, with a known price, might differ from another person’s: 
jobbers do not make the market in fresh milk or television subscriptions, brokers do.
Jobbers are engaged in financial practice. Norms emerge out of practice and 
become formulated as explicit rules or principles because they work (Brandom 1994, 
p. 21). Jobbers are seeking to converge on understanding and Habermas (1984) has 
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explored the norms necessary for effective deliberation. Statements need to be com-
prehensible and, where appropriate, conform to matters of fact. They must be objec-
tively true. Statements must also represent the honest intention of the speaker; they 
must be truthful. Finally, they must conform to what the community believes is right 
and be ethically or morally acceptable.
The comprehensibility of statements is accounted for by everyone engaged in 
the market having been indoctrinated into the grammar of price quoting and how 
prices imply beliefs. Meanwhile, the practice of jobbers holding limited positions 
for short periods of time implies they have linear utility functions that avoid ambi-
guity. However, in a jobber-mediated market there are no ‘matters of fact’. In these 
circumstances, the objective truth of a statement is addressed by it conforming to 
the evaluative standard that a price precludes arbitrage. The institution of dual-quot-
ing ensures the truthfulness of the jobber, while ensuring reliability by allowing a 
jobber to present a falsehood to correct an earlier incorrect price quotation. Having 
addressed the objective and subjective validity of a price quote, there remains the 
norm that addresses its social rightness.
The rightness of the statements in a jobber-mediated market is partially addressed 
by the reciprocity embedded in the FTAP. Reciprocity is essential because it delivers 
justice in exchange that supports social cohesion. The DBA has been associated with 
the ‘Golden Rule’—“Do to others as you would have them do to you” (Slater 1993; 
Wattles 1996), since dual-quoting ensures the jobber cannot exploit a counterparty 
and delivers jobbers’ sincerity. However, if financial markets are to be regarded as 
centres of communicative action the ‘rightness’ of prices must be addressed more 
explicitly.
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice characterises the virtue of charity in the 
form of Antonio, a merchant of Venice. The play is popular, although problematic in 
interpretation (Midgley 1960, p. 119) with contemporary audiences finding it inco-
herent with the last scene of the play redundant. However, if the play is interpreted 
as highlighting the necessity of charity in human affairs (Gollancz 1931; Coghill 
1950; Lewalski 1962), the play appears coherent.
The play is motivated by a young Venetian, Bassanio, who wishes to marry a 
wealthy heiress, Portia, but needs three thousand ducats to fund the courtship. He 
approaches his friend, Antonio, a wealthy merchant. Because all Antonio’s funds are 
tied up in long-distance commercial ventures, the merchant approaches the Jew, Shy-
lock, to arrange a loan of cash. Shylock does not charge usury but imposes a legiti-
mate poena on the loan: if Antonio fails to pay, he must forfeit a ‘pound of flesh’. All 
Antonio’s investments in trading ventures are lost and he is unable to repay Shylock 
and so must forfeit the poena. Portia, having been successfully courted by Bassanio, 
disguises as a lawyer and saves Antonio by noting that Shylock is entitled to a pound 
of flesh, but not to any blood, making it impossible for Shylock to receive the poena. 
This is where many feel the play should end, but there is one last scene where there 
is an exchange of rings and Portia delivers a letter that reports the safe return of his 
trading vessels. This final scene represents the repayment of Antonio’s original loan 
by its ultimate beneficiary, Portia.
The play is about commerce, in its broadest sense, and thirteen exchanges 
occur in the play. The religious aspect of the play is in its use of Antonio as a 
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metaphor for Christ who brings Bassanio, as Everyman, to Portia, as Grace or 
Mercy. Shylock personifies Judaism’s commitment to ‘the Law’ (Lewalski 1962, 
p. 331; Merchant of Venice, IV.i.104; IV.i.144, Heb 2:17–18; Phill 2:7). A secular 
interpretation of the play is that the play explores the problem of deontological 
ethics in an uncertain environment. Both Antonio and Shylock are confident of 
the future: Antonio believes his investments can be liquidated, Shylock believes 
he can legally kill Antonio. However, neither prediction comes true, emphasising 
the unpredictability of the world. Antonio, representing Christian charity, is sup-
ported in this uncertain environment by a social network that rescues him from 
disaster; Shylock’s commitment to the law does not help him. The play shows 
that, in an uncertain world, judgements cannot be based solely on established law 
but, to be ‘wise’, should relate to mercy and judgement (Coolidge 1976, p. 256). 
The play emphasises that an individual’s experience, knowledge and judgement 
will be insufficient in identifying the best actions when the future is unpredict-
able. Robust solutions need to be developed through a communal, deliberative 
process, such as a jobber-mediated market.
An absence of the norm charity played a part in the 1998 failure of Long Term 
Capital Management (LTCM), the most significant financial failure of the second 
half of the twentieth century. LTCM constructed trading strategies that would take 
advantage of small price discrepancies that were funded by short-term loans backed 
by securities, so called repurchase or ‘repo’, agreements, which are the high-finance 
equivalent of low-finance pawning. The strategy proved highly successful and pro-
vided LTCM’s investors with exceptionally high returns at, apparently, little risk. 
This seemed to confound the established financial belief that high returns are only 
possible at high risk.
In 1997, there was a collapse in Asian financial markets that had ramifications 
across the globe but had little impact on LTCM’s performance. On August 17 1998, 
the Russian government defaulted on its debt, a scenario LTCM had considered and 
were, in theory, immunised against. However, while LTCM had considered the risk 
that Russia would default, others had not and in the aftermath of the default, inves-
tors exchanged their riskier assets for more secure ones, such as US Government 
bonds (MacKenzie 2008, p. 230). This ‘flight to quality’ presented LTCM with an 
opportunity to make greater profits by selling the overpriced government bonds and 
buying the under-valued, riskier, assets.
On 2 September, LTCM faxed its investors to inform them of some losses experi-
enced in August but went on to highlight the opportunities that the market volatility 
presented and asked for more money to exploit them. Within five minutes of the fax 
being sent out, it had been posted on the internet (MacKenzie 2003a, b, p. 365). This 
had two effects. The market anticipated that LTCM would sell assets to raise money, 
and so the price of any asset LTCM was rumoured to hold, fell. More critically for 
LTCM, counterparties noted that the firm was asking investors for more money and 
questioned its credit worthiness; they were focusing on the first and last message in 
the fax and ignoring the middle part of the message, which identified opportunities. 
As a result, LTCM were forced to deposit more collateral to support the repurchase 
agreements funding its trading strategies. This was perfectly reasonable behaviour 
by LTCM’s counterparties.
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As LTCM no longer had access to the repo market at advantageous rates that 
funded their positions they were forced to sell-off their sound investments in US 
Government bonds. The apparent arbitrage that underpinned their success was based 
on the existence of the repo market. This assumption had proved to be unreliable 
and represented the inherent risk of the strategy, which explained the strategies’ high 
returns. A sense of schadenfreude developed in the markets as less successful firms 
bet against LTCM, further undermining it. At the end of August, LTCM had had 
around $2 billion available to cover its trading activities. This quickly evaporated 
and on 20 September the US government brokered a deal where by a consortium 
of banks would provide the hedge fund with $3.6 billion in exchange for 90% of 
the company. The original shareholders were left with only a fraction of what they 
thought they had had at the end of August (MacKenzie 2008, pp. 225–231).
In the aftermath of the failure of LTCM it became popular to accuse the firm of 
recklessness. A more accurate explanation is that LTCM’s failure was an example of 
hubris followed by nemesis, similar to Shakespeare’s portrayal of Shylock. LTCM 
employed scientific, critical, thinking in developing its trading strategies that were 
based on mathematical models. On this basis they imagined that they could earn 
risk-less profits, unlike their competitors who were bound by the established conven-
tions. This arrogance isolated them and so at the first sign of weakness, competitors 
acted in a way that destroyed, rather than supported, the firm.
An alternative to the competitive approach to finance is given by the experience 
of the Quakers between the late seventeenth and the middle of the nineteenth centu-
ries. While relatively small in number, Quakers came to dominate English finance. 
Like Antonio, the Quakers were scrupulous in repaying debts during a time char-
acterised by high levels of default (Prior and Kirby 2006, pp. 121–129; Walvin 
1998, pp. 55–57), highlighting their reciprocity. They “detested that which is com-
mon, to ask for more goods than the market price, or what they may be afforded for; 
but usually set the price at one word” (Walvin 1998, p. 32), while there have been 
reports—in the context of a discussion of the future of science, relevant here—of 
Quaker shop-keepers ‘dual quoting’ in everyday commerce (Russell 2005, p. 60), 
emphasising their sincerity. Quakers were also renowned for their charity (Cookson 
2003; Walvin 1998, pp. 81–90), and their attitudes to lending were encapsulated in 
their proverb:
“Well, Friend”, said the Quaker Banker, “Tell me the answers to these ques-
tions so that I may help you in your projects, for you have opportunities: 
Firstly, how much do you seek to borrow? For how long? And how will you 
repay the loan plus its interest?” These are the issues all good bankers must 
explore. (Phillips, n.d.)
Adhering to these three moral norms ensured that Quakers were trusted, which was 
the foundation of their commercial success, when all around them there were “usuri-
ous contracts, false chevisance and other crafty deceits” (Murphy 2009, p. 83).
Charity, reciprocity and sincerity are fundamental to the trust that lays the foun-
dation of finance. The decline in financial ethics is not endogenous as ideas exter-
nal to finance have been imposed on financial practice. An important precedent in 
English civil law is Buttle v Saunders ([1950] 2 All ER 193), where it was judged 
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that commercial morality was subordinate to maximising profits. The ascendency 
of economic positivism and the doctrines of efficient markets and expected utility 
maximisation have originated in academic theory and then have been established 
through the courts, not endogenously in market practice.
Unlike reciprocity and sincerity, the role of charity does not play a significant part 
in enabling mathematics. ‘Social rightness’ does highlight that communities need 
to be held together by shared beliefs, a factor important in mathematics as a social 
enterprise. The charitable aspect of finance is useful to understand in relation to 
mathematical practice in order to address concerns of mathematicians of engaging 
with finance in the aftermath of successive financial crises (Rogalski 2010; Korman 
2011). Some respond to these criticisms by arguing that mathematicians have an 
essential role in redeeming finance, for example by guiding better regulation (Eke-
land 2010; Haggstrom 2012). The Merchant of Venice highlights the inadequacy of 
these, deontological, approaches when faced with uncertainty and there are simi-
lar arguments against calculating consequences in such circumstances (Anscombe 
1958, pp. 9–16). In the face of unpredictability, reliance needs to be founded on 
social cohesion that enables mutual support so that the best solution to an unfamiliar 
problem will emerge. Good science is necessary for finance, but not sufficient.
7  Conclusions
The abstraction of a physical commodity into a quantified financial contract has 
played an important role in the mathematisation of western society. In particular, 
financial ethics has provided the prototype on which mathematical probability has 
been developed.
Probability was originally conceived in relation to subjective ethical judgement 
but began to take on an objective character in Cardano’s investigation of the ethics 
of gambling. The objective nature of probability came to dominate as it was used to 
address questions of uncertainty in the physical sciences. There was a renaissance of 
subjective probability in the twentieth century associated with problems related to 
finance and other social domains. Ramsey introduced the Dutch Book Argument to 
counter Keynes’ assertion that there were phenomena not amenable to probability. 
The work of De Finetti and L. J. Savage led to a revolution in Bayesian/subjective 
approaches to inference.
The most popular modern justification for subjective probability is the Dutch 
Book Argument, which only works if the agents involved are required to act as job-
bers and dual quote. Less well known is the Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pric-
ing which is the foundational theorem of financial mathematics. As a synthesis of 
financial practice and Kolmogorov’s abstract approach to probability, the FTAP 
resolves many of the problems that have been raised in respect to the DBA. As a 
result, finance has enabled the development and practical understanding of subjec-
tive probability.
The paper identifies that the institution of jobbers allows market-makers to offer 
prices—make statements—that they do not believe are true. This is done to enable 
errors in assertions to be corrected and aids the reliability of the jobber-mediated 
1 3
Synthese 
market. The idea that falsehoods support reliability has been observed in mathemati-
cal modelling of physical systems.
Issues with the application of utility functions have also been discussed in the 
paper. Utility is not a core concept in mathematical finance, where the emphasis is 
on choosing a pricing, subjective probability, measure. This has implications since 
utility theory is still central to economic theories such as in providing insurers with a 
justification for charging customers premiums that will prove profitable.
In a broader context, subjective probability relates to social, as distinct from 
physical, systems. As such, it represents the use of mathematics to aid practical, as 
distinct from pure, reasoning. This reflects Locke’s division of understanding into 
practica and physica and Kant’s separation of practical and pure reasoning. The 
application of mathematics to finance highlights that, in regard to practical reason-
ing, decisions cannot be based solely on objective criteria since there are few ‘mat-
ters of fact’ that will persist in relation to social systems. This is important because, 
while mathematics plays a passive role in describing physical systems, as soon as 
mathematics is applied to social systems it has the potential to actively direct them.
Relying solely on objective criteria when representing social phenomena, like 
finance, is fraught with problems. Firstly, by their very nature, objective criteria can 
be manipulated. A fraudster can adopt the dress of the clergy to gain trust. Social 
media ‘likes’ and ‘retweets’ can be mechanised giving a false impression of wide-
spread support. Trust in Bitcoin, and other crypto-currencies, is founded on the 
block-chain and the way Bitcoins are minted. These algorithms are supposed to offer 
an objective basis for trust in the currency that circumvents the need for subjec-
tive and social foundations (Christopher 2016). However, the ‘objective’ criteria on 
which crypto-currencies are built give a misplaced perception of privacy (they leave 
a digital trail that can only be disrupted through the use of ‘tumblers’), reliability 
(transactions are dropped when traffic is high) and security (an agent who controls 
50% + 1 of the nodes, controls the ledger).
Current experiments with electronic money and privatised ‘tokens’ invite renewed 
consideration of ‘what is money?’ Traditionally, money has had to be universal and 
fungible. This is changing with new forms of money and presents a risk that ine-
qualities within society are reinforced as the communality of money is lost. Hence 
financialisation can be beneficial or harmful depending on how it is deployed. More 
generally, the arguments of this paper suggest that money acts like a language and so 
is open to a ‘linguistic turn’ in its investigation. This observation suggests compari-
son with efforts to understand the nature of mathematics as a language. Skovsmose 
et  al. (2016) discusses mathematics as language by investigating the relationship 
between mathematics and objective description, subjective inscription, social pre-
scription that culminates in communities subscribing to mathematical models. This 
appears to relate to the objective reciprocity of a price, its subjective sincerity, and 
social charity leading to communal trust presented here. These connections between 
financial markets and mathematics as language suggest deep connections between 
financial and mathematical cultures that might be explored further.
This paper has approached markets through discourse ethics to address radical 
uncertainty. Discourse ethics, the paper argues, address the problem of Hume’s 
Law, which is associated with the emergence of capitalism. Sotiropoulos, Milios, 
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& Lapatsioras (2013) present a contemporary Marxist re-evaluation of finance that 
recognises the significance of uncertainty, and makes observations compatible to the 
ones presented here, specifically the necessity of a democratic finance, owned and 
controlled by the users of money. This suggests that by approaching finance as a 
radically uncertain domain commonality between radically different social theories 
can be found.
More broadly, there is a current perception (Heimans and Timms 2018) that the 
nature of power is changing. This is based on the belief that the advent of internet 
based modes of communication means that power is shifting from those that own 
resources to those who can manipulate social networks. Such a change would not be 
novel. Seaford (2004) distinguishes Mesopotamian hierarchical society from Greek 
monetised and deliberative society. The Medieval monetisation of Catholic Europe 
saw sovereigns challenged by commercial networks. Financialisation from the sev-
enteenth century has enabled persecuted minorities, such as Jews, Dutch Calvinists 
and Quakers, who had strong communal networks, to exert extra-ordinary influence. 
Understanding how financial technology and influence has emerged out of commu-
nities, rather than ex catherdra theories of finance and society, might help in under-
standing current fluxes in society.
These observations are relevant to the increasingly important topic of algorithmic 
decision making, which is beginning to affect people’s daily life as it is applied to 
social media and on-line retailing (Chen et  al. 2016). Algorithmic pricing, which 
exists only in electronic, broker mediated markets, is justified on the basis that it 
improves competitiveness and efficiency in markets. Unfortunately it can also have 
unintended consequences, such as ‘flash crashes’, or might even be designed to 
manipulate markets to the benefit of the algorithm designer. The crude approach that 
all market activity is beneficial (Foresight 2012, p. Section 8.2) pre-supposes that 
liquidity is a utility service and not a more complex consequence of market trust 
built on the sincerity required in ‘dual quoting’.
There is a risk, identified in finance, that algorithmic decision making can result 
in ‘super-portfolios’ that give the illusion of diversification that results in crises 
(MacKenzie 2003a, b). With the growth of algorithmic decision-making, the danger 
of ‘unthinking’ algorithms delivering a similar monism of opinions needs careful 
consideration. A problem in finance that is sometimes observed is that outputs from 
different models using the same input data are often contradictory. These differ-
ences are often understood by expert modellers but can lead to doubt in the minds of 
decision-makers, who believe a model should present an objective representation. A 
common response to this uncertainty is to build more complex models that integrate 
more statistical data, create a Laplacian Demon, rather than accept the differences 
and make a judgement.
An alternative to building ever more accurate representational models is to view 
the models as signifiers. Each model presents a slightly different perspective on an 
unknowable future. In this conception a collection of models represents a ‘college’ 
rather than a ‘toolbox’ and the decision-maker must integrate the different perspec-
tives to make a judgement. This is possible through deliberation even when views 
are based on implicit intuition and not explicit deduction. This is important outside 
finance where results of machine learning and agent based modelling are often not 
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amenable to audit. Establishing the rhetorical conventions that can accommodate the 
intuition of machines, just as we can accept the intuition of humans in deliberation, 
would be revolutionary. This relates to questions about the deployment of Artificial 
Intelligence within an organisation and how to make AI more trustworthy (Lei et al. 
2016; Tarafdar et al. 2017).
Knowing about the role of finance in stimulating the development of the practi-
cal mathematics of judgement under uncertainty is useful because it highlights that 
practical mathematics has a different genealogy to the pure mathematics of repre-
senting the physical world. An important distinction highlighted by finance is that, 
in uncertain environments, relying on the objective validity, on its own, is insuf-
ficient and account must be made of subjective and social validity. These points are 
important when thinking about the role of mathematics when applied to social sys-
tems more generally, where mathematical models can actively affect the system. The 
risk of not clearly understanding the distinction between pure and practical math-
ematics is that humans will come to behave like computers, not the risk that comput-
ers will come to behave like humans.
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